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ABSTRACT
This work examines the accidents and shortcomings inexperienced American pilots
experienced during the opening days of Operation TORCH and attributes these mishaps
to inadequate training and inexperience. Through a comparative approach, American
training programs and text are contrasted against those of the British. By analyzing the
base training methods of the RAF and observing their effectiveness when used in the
North Africa and Mediterranean theatre at Malta provides a solid example where a well
developed and battle exposure prove effective. This frame work served as a framework to
compare the deficiencies of American airmen.
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Introduction

In late 1942, the sands of Morocco and its adjacent waters became crash sites for
many American military pilots and their aircraft. Operation TORCH involved an
American invasion of Vichy-held ports in French North Africa, particularly in Morocco.
The United States Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation suffered heavy casualties during
the opening days of Operation TORCH, starting on the morning of November 8, 1942.
The mistakes made by American pilots can be better understood when compared to the
successful performance of the Royal Air Force. The Americans and British faced entirely
different enemies, who presented them with different levels of challenges. The RAF on
Malta fought against veteran and determined professionals of the Luftwaffe as well as
Mussolini’s Regia Aeronautica, in contrast to the less formidable Vichy forces faced by
the Americans. A sharp contrast existed between the performances of the ill-trained and
unprepared American air forces and the veteran British Royal Air Forces defending Malta
and the critically important east-west convoy route through the Mediterranean during
1940-45. Throughout the 1940 Battle of Britain and the Axis’ air siege of Malta during
1941-42 the British gained valuable experience.
The contrast between the abilities of the two Allies involved in Operation
TORCH is the crux of this work. It is a comparative history that compares the actual
performances of the RAF and the American air units involved in TORCH. This thesis
examines and discusses the shortcomings of the American Army Air Corps and naval air
arm, in particular their fighter aircraft pilots. These include the lack of proper pilot

2
training, the state of preparedness for combat missions, and the use of underpowered
aircraft.
This study fits into the historiography of North Africa in World War II. It
parallels a recent major work by historian Rick Atkinson, his An Army at Dawn: The War
in North Africa, 1942-1943. Atkinson accurately portrays the American army in this
theater as initially ill-trained and ill-equipped for war against Germany’s Panzer Armee
Afrika. In his analysis of the American ground forces, he excludes the Army Air Corps
division, even though this arm was instrumental to the success of American military
forces fighting in North Africa. I argue that the Army Air Corps and the United States’
naval air arm all suffered from a state of inexperience and did not achieve adequate
readiness for battle. I contrast the American pilots’ performance in the opening of
TORCH to the proficiency level attained by the British Royal Air Force by late 1942
from valuable experience gained from their ordeal on and above the Western Desert and
Malta. The second part evaluates the problems encountered by the ill-equipped American
fighter pilots in the invasion of North Africa during Operation TORCH.
This work uses primary sources to assess the level of the American air units’
initial performances in Operation TORCH in French Morocco. The US air units played a
large role in the first days of the Operation and experienced unexpected heavy losses
from pilot error, inexperience, and insufficient training. In order to undertake an accurate
comparative history I also turned to primary sources that contributed to accurately
examine and gauge the British pilots’ effectiveness. The most important source covering
American pilots came from the official after action reports. These reports gave the
clearest unaltered account on the losses and outcome of the sorties flown during the
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opening days of TORCH. I examined and researched the after action reports of the 33rd
Fighter Group and files of the naval groups involved in order to bring relevant primary
source data to this work. These after action reports served as my key primary source. At
the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland (NACP), I
sifted through a total of fourteen boxes of archival naval records including photographs,
squadron records, action reports, and debriefing forms. The after action reports on the
military operations reveal the staggering number of American planes missing in action
and the large number of casualties caused by pilot error. Data from these archives
contained the official record of the 33rd Fighter Group’s operational history, from
November 8, 1942, to February 29, 1944. In addition I turned to naval records of the
Wildcats launched in the first day of the operation. Boxes containing the records broken
down by squadrons VF-41, VF-9, VF-26, VF-28 yielded a wealth of data, forms, and
photographs. The American carriers involved in the operation included the USS Ranger,
USS Suwannee, USS Sangamon, and the USS Santee. I found archived records cataloged
specifically for the USS Santee, USS Sangamon, and the USS Ranger at the NACP. These
official records proved invaluable to my work.
Since a large portion of my thesis investigates the effectiveness of both British
and American pilot training programs, I turned to other sources researching an array of
original manuals and training materials used in the programs. The British flight training
curriculum required texts by David Hay Surgeoner and the practical flight training
manual edited by Leonard Taylor. I acquired accesses to these through the Museum of
Flight archives as well as copies of materials of the American training program. Not only
did I study these materials written for the cadets, I also examined the Instructors
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Handbook of Advanced Training written by Henry Walton, an invaluable source to
understand the high standards with which the instructors were expected to teach their
program. The equivalent air navigation manual, Fm 1-30 Air Corps Field Manual of Air
Navigation, used by in the American pilot training program, is a gross simplification of
Surgeoner’s work on the same subject. It was important to go to these sources for an
accurate comparison of the two training programs as well as their conjunction with
secondary sources for an accurate and well informed comparison and analysis.
This thesis utilizes information from pilots’ journals and memoirs. Using material
written from the pilots themselves provides a fresh perspective to uncovering their
trainings effectiveness and recounting events and their actions from their own point of
view. Diaries of Lieutenant Wordell and Lieutenant Seiler, two American Wildcat pilots,
published shortly after TORCH, in 1943, provide insight into problems that bedeviled
during the operation. Other primary works published that year include Spitfire pilot
George Beurling’s account of his experiences over Malta. Memoirs written later include
George Barclay’s account as a fighter pilot. This work appeared in print only in 1976.
Lord James Douglas Hamilton assembled and published a superb collection of diaries of
fighter pilots who defended Malta. The island was under siege during 1940-1943, and
these aviators developed further the methods of British air combat. Their diaries reveal in
great detail how they defend the island from Axis attack.
Pilots alone did not produce the only informative diaries: Lieutenant-General
Lewis Brereton’s diary, particularly, yielded important information regarding leadership,
base structure, and operations. Along with the diary and memoirs of specific pilots, I
consulted training manuals and original aircraft maintenance and operation handbooks to
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obtain data on the specifications and features of their aircraft and equipment. I utilized
these technical sources to uncover possible explanations of their accidents and mistakes.
Archival photographs of the North African air bases provided insight on the configuration
and conditions of the units. Beyond diaries, manuals, and photographs, I examined
journals, speeches, and newspapers.
I explored public opinion on these topics evident in The London Times and
excerpts from British Parliamentary Papers. These sources, although biased, provide
primary perceptions of the events. Some of the articles reveal mishaps of the American
air units during Operation TORCH. Along with newspapers, I utilized relevant speeches
delivered by Winston Churchill. A source that directly assessed the problem of
insufficient training and the high frequency of air accidents was the American GI
magazine, Yank and the Army Weekly. One of its articles addressed the recurring
regularity of Army Air Corps accidents and mishaps, with commentary from General
Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general in 1942 of the US Army’s air arm. When
dealing with these primary sources, it was important to be mindful of their intended
audience. Beyond chronological journals, Army Air Corps publications proved to be very
helpful for my research. These official publications laid out the structure and organization
of the American training program, which, when juxtaposed with publications from the
Air Corps newsletter, addressed safety concerns connected to training. From this, the
severity of America’s problems surrounding training started to come into focus.
Secondary sources proved to be of great help. The majority of them dealt
separately with the Americans and the British in the North African theater. I compare the
capabilities and training leveled on both air forces. The contrast between the data pulled
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from an array of primary and secondary sources revealed that American aviators’ level of
training, preparedness, hardware, and effectiveness lagged far behind those in the RAF.
Wesley Frank Craven’s multivolume work is one of the most extensive works
written about the air forces of World War II. Craven provided details pertaining to
American training, deployment, and operations. Many squadron histories omitted
statistics concerning accidents. For this reason, it is necessary to turn to diaries and after
action reports to reveal the actual nature of these abundant American mishaps. John
Lambert’s work, Wildcats Over Casablanca, November 1942 Operation Torch, proved to
be a particularly valuable source; it documented many of the accidents and problems the
American Wildcat pilots experienced. This information was elsewhere conspicuously
absent. I uncovered more American mistakes as I investigated Edgar F. Raines, Jr’s, 2002
article in Air Power History, “Disaster off Casablanca: Air Observation Posts in
Operation Torch and the Role of Failure in Institutional Innovation.” These sources
contributed greatly to my work, particularly when I crosschecked and reconsidered them
by utilizing information from primary sources.
I approach this history from a variety of different perspectives. Accordingly, I
have included an Italian source from which I translated and extracted the Italian
perspective on their campaign against the British in Malta. An understanding of the
unique specifications of all the fighter aircraft involved proved vital when comparing
their performance against each other in combat. I gathered this information from a
combination of primary sources that include the actual aircraft type manufacture
maintenance manuals and the highly accurate performance specifications provided by
Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardui in their Military Aircraft Encyclopedia.
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A pattern emerged from my research: America’s air forces arrived in combat unprepared for war. In contrast, Great Britain’s RAF employed well-seasoned tactics to
achieve lethal effect. Following the 1940 Battle of Britain, the RAF benefited greatly
from its experiences defending Malta and engaging the Luftwaffe and the Regia
Aeronautica over the desert. These missions resulted in adaptability, a heightened level of
effectiveness, and success. I found it useful to explore events surrounding the siege of
Malta to comprehend the environment where the RAF responded to the challenges of
defending this strategic island as well using it for offense. During the siege, the RAF
managed to continue to attack Axis convoys vital to Afrika Korps offensives. Multiple
secondary sources provided this information from different perspectives. Emile
Bradford’s Siege Malta 1940-1943 contained invaluable charts and tables containing
statistics relating to attacks and operations. Bradford also provided an extremely detailed
account of the events from multiple perspectives, including those of Maltese civilians.
James Holland’s Fortress Malta: An Island under Siege 1940-43 provided a framework
and timeline where I could assess first-hand accounts from pilot diaries and memoirs. As
I aimed to develop a comparison of the British RAF to the abilities of the US air forces, I
needed to examine British aerial attack tactics, especially those relating to fighter
interception and torpedo bombing from Malta. Kenneth Poolman’s Night Strike from
Malta: 830 Squadron RN and Rommel’s Convoys emerged as one of the most rewarding
sources for this task, as it detailed these strike missions and included diagrams and pilot
accounts. Samuel Elliot Morrison’s meticulously detailed work on the actions of the
American Navy allowed me to construct an accurate framework on the details of the US
Navy carrier operations during the opening days of TORCH.
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My work, uniquely, assesses the level of performance and preparedness of the
American air forces in a comparative framework involving an RAF counterpart. My
comparative work reflects my research on the RAF and American air elements in actively
explaining and evaluating their performance over Malta and over French Morocco. This
study reveals the difference in skill and state of readiness between these fighter units. My
secondary sources cover these air powers separately. I draw a stark division between the
two by comparing training, combat experience, and utility. The diaries reveal that the
pilots of the two Allied nations in 1942 possessed very different levels of preparedness.
This thesis concludes that British military aviators by 1941 and 1942 were, generally,
well trained pilots with substantial combat experience, both of which the American pilots
lacked. Their inexperience and naivety regarding the reality of war made them far more
likely than their RAF counterparts to make mistakes. Compared to the battle-hardened
RAF, the training and performance of American air units during TORCH lagged far
behind.
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Prologue: Assessing Prewar Fighter Aircraft Development in Great Britain and
the United States

A number of political, economic, and ideological reasons account for the stark
contrast between American and British aircraft and pilot training programs during the
early years of the Second World War. Great Britain and America were at this time two
very different entities, an empire and a republic, each with its distinctive traditions,
economy, and emphasis in matters of defense. Historically, Britain long maintained a
standing army of expertly trained professional soldiers serving its imperial aims of
protecting its colonies and its home front. America’s military developed in quite an
opposite way and consisted largely of state militias activated only in times of war.
America’s peacetime standing army was quite minimal in size and often deficient in
modernizing its equipment.
Geographically speaking, Britain at home had only a narrow channel to protect
itself from invasion while the borders of the United States fronted on two vast oceans and
a huge gulf. In the years leading up to World War II, the British decided the best way for
them to defend their homeland was to develop highly advanced fighter planes that could
be used in conjunction with a network of radar and expertly trained pilots who would
patrol in formations and protect the coast. Following the advice of Chief Air Marshal and
leader of Fighter Command, Sir Hugh Dowding, and England allocated substantial
resources into forming a strong, modern, and separate air force. This involved funding of
research to build planes of sufficient high quality that they could compete against the
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advanced fighters of the Luftwaffe. Additionally, the standardized courses set by the
leaders of the RAF benefited greatly from the circumstance that they were created with
only aviation in mind. These developments were in stark contrast to America’s efforts to
create or bolster its program of military aviation.
The two oceans and the Panama Canal stood as America’s buffers from invasion
and, since, these areas were so vast, the fighter aircraft of the 1930’s could not
sufficiently patrol and cover them as was the case with RAF fighters over the English
Channel. In this way, the United States continued to focus its military preparedness on
building a massive two ocean navy around battleships even though the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-22 had restricted the capital ship tonnage of the world’s maritime
naval powers. America had no separate air force, for military aviation was included
within the army and the navy. American naval aviation developed faster than the Army
Air Corps, for it was viewed as a method to protect the fleet’s torpedo and dive bombers
and missions performed by its battleships and lesser surface vessels. Partly for this
reason, the American-made Navy Wildcat fighter had more firepower than the land-based
P-40 Army Warhawk; fighters were seen as more useful to protect the all-important
surface ships. In Operation Torch Wildcat pilots performed poorly because they had not
been trained nor were intended to for use against targets on the coast or land based
fighters.
A major factor behind America possessing such poorly made fighter aircraft and
creating a substandard training program was America’s socio-economic structure. As a
capitalist free market nation, America depended on private enterprise, individuals seeking
personal gain, and, even under the New Deal, private businesses continued to function as
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profit-seeking entities. This extended to the prewar aviation industry. Unlike countries in
Europe whose governments had been rapidly developing commercial and military
aviation, American aviation grew from its barnstormers, private inventors and risk-taking
investors. Their advances and gains were meant to benefit their own interests and not
governed at all by military contributions. Government aircraft production lacked access
to their innovation. This pattern of individualism did not fulfill the army’s needs for
aircraft and pilot training programs, as it involved no standardized methods of producing
aviators.
In the United States prior to the war, Congress had failed to adequately fund
military aviation. This lack of funding dated back to 1918. At the executive level,
Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Franklin Roosevelt privatized transporting air mail
because the Army Air Corps experienced numerous plane crashes often caused by
structural failures of its poorly developed and constructed aircraft. Vital airframe
structures such as tails or wings had frequently broken off American Army planes flying
mail during the interwar years. Aviation was relatively new and without adequate funding
or standardized aircraft production the incentive and time for the American military to
develop solid planes between 1918 and 1941were absent.
In contrast to the operation of aviation for corporate profits, official goals for
military aviation necessarily determined production figures. Many air-minded Americans,
especially government officials and military leaders, strongly believed that strategic
bombing was the key to winning wars. More time and energy was devoted to construct
long range heavy bombers towards developing fighters. Only later in the war, during
1943, did American generals discover that development of a long range fighter plane was
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essential to the success of bombing missions. This type of aircraft needed to escort and
protect the bombers to and from their targets. Newer, improved models of the P-51
Mustang were rushed into production. Michael Sherry, in his Rise of American Air
Power, discusses the prewar and the wartime debates surrounding America’s funneling
energy and resources towards long range bombing. This mentality set American aviators
apart from those of other nations like Germany, which relied almost solely on the tactical
use of its fighter aircraft. In this America’s defense barrier provided by its wide oceans
and supplemented by its mood of isolationism before Pearl Harbor facilitated long range
strategic bombing and not short range tactical missions provided by fighter aircraft.
America uniquely among the powers of that time enjoyed vast amounts of
resources and capital, despite the Great Depression of the 1930’s. America’s confidence
in its ability to mass produce materials led to the production of poorly designed aircraft in
greater numbers than could be reasonably crewed by competently trained personnel in
preparation for war. America had lapsed into the mistake of relying on vast mass
production of materials and setting unrealistic goals of production numbers without
stepping back and considering their quality and functionality.
Political decisions placed new air bases in zones of temperate climates to better
suit base occupants and their aircraft. Continental training facilities situated in difficult
climates such as the desert regions of the American Southwest would have better
prepared pilots for what they were to encounter over North Africa.
General James Doolittle, who prior to the war had advocated for aviation and
commanded the famous raid on Tokyo in early 1942, later headed the Twelfth Air force
in North Africa. He had been one of the first to develop instrument flying, although it had

13
not been worked into the training curriculum. Doolittle had visited Europe before the war
intending to gather information on foreign air forces and, because of that, he was aware
that American aircraft development lagged far behind that of other powers, including
Great Britain and Nazi Germany. He was not in a position at the time to change
American policy nor had he the power to implement an improved training doctrine. After
TORCH, Doolittle issued a newly revised and reworked training manual to fill the gaps
made so evident during this Moroccan operation.
Had America broken out of its pattern of continuing to train government pilots
poorly and build inferior aircraft, it should had fared much better in its opening campaign
of the European war. If America had directed its attention to the advancements in aircraft
design and performance in Europe, realizing how far behind it really was, things may
have turned out much differently by the time of TORCH. America, however, remained
essentially isolationist from the end of the First World War; it wanted nothing to do with
European conflicts. In doing so it closed itself off to advanced developments made in
military aviation. Congress chose to deny significant funding towards aviation and
insisted that it remain subordinate inside the division separating the Army and the Navy.
These circumstances help stagnant its growth and development. On the other side of the
Atlantic, the British Royal Air Force had focused much attention to its fighter aircraft and
pilot training programs. The British further separated their bombers into Bomber
Command, an organization with its own leadership, training, and command structure.
Fighter Command enjoyed parallel features.
The RAF’s projected role in the defense of its empire, the defense of its home
islands, and the defense of its European allies made clear the importance of fighter
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aircraft. For home defense, this meant fighters as the key tactical element. The
Government fully supported the efforts and requests of the top leaders in the RAF.
Figures such as Sir Hugh Dowding and Leigh Mallory led the way with their contribution
towards the development of integrated tactics that best served the needs of home defense
through the use of modern fighter aircraft. Sir Hugh Dowding commanded Fighter
Command and established Britain’s advanced network of fighter defense enhanced by the
use of radar. Lee Mallory devised methods of using fighter planes in mass formations to
maximize their effectiveness. The opening events of the Second World War, involving
British fighters sent into combat to assist Britain’s allies in the Battle of France and
Britain’s fighter defense against air attacks by the Germans in the Battle of Britain
justified the early projections and efforts of Britain’s fighter command. Due to these early
efforts, Britain, by the start of the Luftwaffe’s air offensive against her, was armed with
the Chain Home network of coastal radar stations, together with fully modernized
fighters manned by a pool of well trained pilots. The Battle of France and the Battle of
Britain also generated useful survivors, veteran pilots with substantial air combat
experience. This greatly benefited later RAF’s operations in the Mediterranean and North
Africa.
The restrictions due to America’s Army Air Corps inclusion within the regular
army caused American military aviation to be stifled in both funding and progress. The
Army Air Corps had to share funding with the regular army. The U.S. Army generals
were responsible for both ground and air operations and usually focused mainly on their
infantry and armored units. Germany and Italy had superb air ministries that allowed for
their sole focus on producing quality aircraft, devising purely aviation minded tactics, and
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adequately equipping and training their pilots. The Royal Air Force, too, was separate
from the Royal Navy and the ground forces, allowing it to mature by the standards of the
late 1930’s.
America’s preoccupation with constructing big-gunned surface war ships and its
dreams of dominating the sky with of long range heavy bombers and its history of nonstandardized training created an environment in which fighter aircraft and pilot training
were liable to be neglected. This thesis endeavors to demonstrate the dimension of this
weakness.
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Chapter 1
The RAF Moves South to North Africa and the Mediterranean

When Europe in World War II turned its attention to the sands of North Africa
and the vital shipping routes of the Mediterranean, its leaders recognized that air
supremacy would be vital. Earlier, during the spring 1940 French campaign, Britain’s
Royal Air Force faced the dilemma of splitting its forces to both assist the French and
protect their homeland. Sir Hugh Dowding, the head of the RAF’s Fighter Command,
was extremely concerned with the rate of RAF fighter losses in its vain effort to prevent
the fall of France. Following Germany’s swift victory in the Battle of France, Fighter
Command experienced its ultimate test that summer as the Luftwaffe attacked the British
homeland. During the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s Fighter Command excelled in
strategic defense, aided by its Chain Home radar defense system and its technologically
advanced fighter aircraft.
After repelling Hermann Göring’s air assault against England, Britain prepared its
air force to perform both offensively and defensively in North Africa and the
Mediterranean. Dowding was no longer in control of Fighter Command; Sir William
Sholto Douglas replaced him in October 1940. 1 Britain’s Eighth Army in North Africa
struggled, often unsuccessfully, against Rommel’s Afrika Korps during 1941 and 1942.
The RAF needed to acquire effective offensive tactics that could assist Montgomery’s
ground force’s efforts against the enemy. It learned to move from a defensive use of air
power to new offensive maneuvers. The new theater of operation required a tactical air

1

Deighton, 226.
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component rather than a strictly defensive one. The RAF had trouble modifying its tactics
to meet the desperate situation it faced in North Africa following the initial arrival of
German units in February 1941. In North Africa, the British operated in a hostile climate
and environment without the aid of radar. The Chain Home radar system existed only in
Britain, so the pilots devised new methods to locate and destroy targets in North Africa.
When the RAF operated beyond the British home islands, it risked severe
setbacks. Additionally, Britain faced severe logistical problems in shipping Spitfires by
sea to areas in the Mediterranean theater. These difficulties delayed the arrival of newer
aircraft to the North African and Mediterranean area. Attacks by the Luftwaffe, Italy’s
Regia Aeronautica, and Axis submarines contributed to the perils of shipping the planes.
Attack aircraft alone proved useless without direction and leadership. Fortunately, strong
British leaders directed its air forces in the Mediterranean in such a way that made it
successful.
In order to compete successfully against Axis planes, the British needed to devise
a new air doctrine featuring stronger leadership. Air Marshal Tedder’s direction provided
the change needed to turn the tide in the Mediterranean in Britain’s favor. Tedder’s plans
allowed for smooth cooperation with the Americans as America’s air units prepared for
action. Tedder’s contribution in conducting harmonious relations allowed American air
units to perform in separate areas of operation, despite their inexperience. His focus on
concentration, flexibility, and mobility eventually led to success for his air units in the
second Battle of El Alamein. Tedder’s leadership also contributed to the integration of
support from the Americans.
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The British found it necessary to devise a solution to coordinate their work with
their new and inexperienced American allies in preparation for Operation TORCH. They
were uncertain whether American units could be integrated, successfully, within their
operations or capable of carrying out their potential assignments. Those tasked to tackle
these problems included Air Marshal Tedder and the joint chiefs, as well as the American
air commanders, particularly Generals Carl Andrew Spaatz and James Harold Doolittle.
Allied Command assigned limited roles to the American air units, including the naval and
army fighter forces. Nonetheless, America contributed to the success of TORCH by
assisting in the capture of French-held shores of Morocco, and the Algerian port cities of
Oran and Algiers. The joint Allied command expanded America’s role to include
securing the three landing areas targeted by Operation TORCH. Allied air units under
Tedder were directed against Rommel’s seaborne supply line.
These new combat operations, sinking Axis shipping, as well as attacking ground
targets, differed greatly from the bomber and fighter intercept missions flown by British
pilots during the Battle of Britain. RAF commanders directed Britain’s Desert Air Force
to attack Axis communications, supply lines, and dug in positions of German ground
units. 2 Early on, the RAF did not direct its units to cooperate with ground forces and,
with minor exceptions, the navy assumed it had enough power to operate on its own,
without the assistance from the RAF. 3 The battleship was still thought to be invincible as
the ultimate weapon on the seas, until several instances of aircraft attacks disproved this
idea. In May 1941 British aircraft attacked the mammoth German battleship Bismarck on
its maiden and final mission against Allied shipping in the North Atlantic. The Royal
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Navy Swordfish biplanes armed with aerial torpedoes disabled the Bismarck, leading to
its destruction. The earlier British success in the Taranto attack of November 11, 1940,
further demonstrated the effectiveness of airpower against capital warships. 4 Its result
stunned the Axis: obsolete British torpedo bomber aircraft sank Italian battleships.
Military leaders together recognized the significant impact of aviation on the course of
naval warfare. Planes could more effectively attack convoys than strike individual ships,
since the later were usually faster. These lessons carried over to North Africa, as the RAF
focused on attacking Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. The Allies used ships
extensively for transporting planes to the North African front. England used both their
aircraft carriers and carriers lent by the United States to ferry Spitfires to North Africa in
order to replace their outmatched Beaufighters and Hurricanes. The American carrier
Wasp encountered heavy enemy resistance while transporting Spitfires to the
Mediterranean. 5 The state of Britain’s aviation technology in relation to its enemies made
a difference in its survival. Britain now valued its own airpower for strategic strikes as
well as defense in the Mediterranean, specifically the island of Malta.
Malta occupied a highly strategic position of strategic importance for the British
Empire. The British acquired the island during the Napoleonic Wars, and Britain
benefited from this colony’s key strategic geographic position during the Second World
War. Before and during the war, the island functioned as a vital airfield and submarine
base in the mid-Mediterranean, serving as the only British military outpost between
Gibraltar, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal. The Axis’ aerial siege of Malta started on June
4
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11, 1940, and lasted several years. The ferocity of the air attacks against Malta presented
the British with a challenge and an opportunity to enhance their defensive and offensive
capacity. They branched out offensively by attacking Axis convoys, thus reducing the
Afrika Korps’ tactical capabilities in the desert. During the aerial siege of Malta, British
pilots honed their air combat skills.
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Chapter 2
Aviation Technology: Axis Planes Fighting in the Desert

The tactical application of British airpower depended to some extent on its aircraft
hardware and technology. In many cases, this lagged behind German fighters designed by
Willy Messerschmitt. In the desert, the RAF used its second-rate planes creatively until
supplied with newer models. In order to understand the limitations of British aircraft, one
needs to juxtapose the RAF’s planes’ attributes against the technology of opposing Axis
fighter planes. The aircraft flown over North Africa and the Mediterranean varied
immensely depending on their many diverse assignments. This section examines the
technical features of the fighter aircraft from both sides involved in the North African
campaign.
The Royal Air Force faced a mixed matchup of machines above the desert. Not
only did the Allies confront German aircraft, but also Italian and French warplanes.
British fighter pilots overcame with little difficulty the German Stuka dive-bombers, the
ME110 fighter-bombers, and the Italian air fleet, but the other German Messerschmitt
fighters proved an entirely different matter. Germany used the battle-tested
Messerschmitt BF-109, due to its nimbleness and speed. The twelve cylinders in the
liquid-cooled engine produced 1,050 hp in 1939, and this increased to 1,475 hp by 1942.
This engine allowed the fighter to scream through the sky at a top speed of 373 mph (600
km/hr). 6 The well-designed plane could bank and turn at impressive rates, making this
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agile fighter a deadly foe. By the end of the war, the BF-109K model boasted 2,000 hp
with a startling top speed of 452 mph (727 km/hr). One problem with the fighter was its
inadequate fuel capacity. Consequently, it did not protect the bombers on their entire
missions during the Battle of Britain. In North Africa, however, the Mediterranean target
areas usually fell within the striking distance of Axis air stations. Messerschmitt modified
the BF-109F to meet North African needs by adding a desert survival pack and a special
filter to protect the air intake. 7 It was armed with two 7.9 mm MG 17 machine-guns in
the front nose cowling and one 20mm cannon that shot through a hole in the prop
spinner. 8 The German Luftwaffe also utilized a fighter designed by Focke Wulf, one even
faster than the BF-109.
The German Focke Wulf 190A-1 excelled in speed and maneuverability even
against the British Spitfire. Kurt Tank designed two variations of the plane in 1937 to
fulfill the German air ministry’s request for a superior interceptor fighter. 9 He
contemplated whether to use an inline engine or a powerful, yet bulky radial engine.
After testing and modifying the two designs in order to find a propulsion system that
would not overheat yet provide the maximum performance output, the radial engine was
selected. The FW 190A-1 contained a fourteen cylinder BMW 801C-1 radial air-cooled
engine that produced an output of 1,600 hp. 10 This massive engine gave the plane an
impressive maximum speed of 389 mph (626 km/hr). These results tested a little faster
than the second variation of the BF-109, which had a top speed of 373 mph (600 km/hr).
For armament the FW 190 housed four cannon and two twenty- millimeter cannon spread
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across its wings. Its fold-up landing gear needed to be extended to provide prop clearance
from the massive engine cowling. This proved to be a minor setback, as the solution did
not provide sufficient structure for the plane. Initially, the Luftwaffe suffered problems
because these planes experienced rough landings, often damaging the landing gear and
the plane, but modifications corrected this problem. The FW 190A-1’s limited range of
497 miles (800 km) meant that it could not fully cover bombers on long missions. The
BF-109 and the FW 190 were the Luftwaffe’s top fighters, while its BF-110 did not
measure up to them.
The Messerschmitt BF-110 was a two engine fighter-bomber with a crew of two
or three. Originally, during the Battle of Britain, the plane’s moderately slow speed,
despite its twin, Daimler-Benz, twelve cylinders, liquid-cooled engines which each
provided 1,050hp, made it vulnerable to RAF fighters. The BF-110’s maximum
operational range was stretched to 680 miles (1,094 km). 11 The plane achieved a top
speed of 336 mph (540 km/hr); its maneuverability compared unfavorably to that of the
nimble single-seat fighters. 12 The plane carried heavy armament, a total of five machine
guns and two twenty-millimeter cannon. Its extensive weight was a liability. It conducted
turns and maneuvers sluggishly when fully loaded with three crew members, fuel, and
weaponry. Clearly, the plane’s weight severely limited its maneuverability. Luftwaffe
pilots found the BF-110 ill-suited to fight against British Hurricanes and Spitfires; it
proved disastrous in the Battle of Britain. When used in the desert, however, the BF-110
fulfilled its original intent. It served different roles, as a reconnaissance and fighter
bomber. This long range airplane was versatile and well-armed, suitable for missions
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above the desert. Later renditions of the BF-110, equipped with night air detection
equipment, made it a night fighter. Its double engines accommodated the added weight of
the night fighting equipment, making the BF-110 a logical choice for this use. 13 The role
assigned to the plane made a big difference in its value and effectiveness. The Luftwaffe
employed not only these long range planes, but also superb fighters and dive bombers to
assist its troops on the ground. Along with its fighters, the Luftwaffe also used divebombers in North Africa and the Mediterranean.
The Stuka dive-bomber became one of the most important parts of the Luftwaffe
servicing Germany’s tactical warfare. The Stuka contributed precision, dive-bomb strikes
on the battlefield. Attempting to strike fear into enemy forces, the aircraft’s wheel struts
held spinners designed to shriek as the plane dived. In the weeks leading up to the Battle
of El Alamein, Stukas flew around three hundred and sixty sorties. The Luftwaffe
suffered from the dwindling number of Stuka planes available for use with Rommel’s
desert ground units, as well as for the continued attack against Malta. The reasons for this
included Allied fighter superiority and anti-aircraft defenses and an increasing shortage
of German pilots, fuel, oil, and other materials, due to Allied air strikes. 14 The plane’s
slow speed caused trouble when defending against enemy aircraft. Germany modified its
Ju.87 Stuka, and, by 1941, produced the Ju.87D-1. The newer Stuka incorporated a few
improvements. Its designers extended the Stuka’s operational range to 940 miles (1,535
km), which vastly exceeded the 490 miles (788 km) range of the first variation. 15 The
Ju.87 D-1 Stuka’s 1,400 hp Junkers Jumo 211J-1 twelve cylinder, liquid-cooled engine
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and its usual armament of up to 3,968 lbs (1,800 kg) of bombs meant that the plane could
achieve a top speed of only 255 mph (410 km/hr). 16 Two aviators manned the Stuka, the
pilot and the gunner. Without the advantage of speed and maneuverability, the Stuka,
despite its four machine guns, was at great risk when encountering enemy fighters. These
disadvantages rendered the Stuka highly vulnerable to Allied fighter aircraft. While the
Stuka failed in the campaign over England, over the desert it could pinpoint targets for
precision bombardment.
Since the Spanish Civil War and the 1940 Battle of Britain, Germany’s air arsenal
included modified, battle-tested air machines. These advanced planes of the Luftwaffe
seemed ready and capable to undertake operations over the desert. The primary reason
the Luftwaffe shifted its attention to the Mediterranean and North African Desert was to
aid its struggling Axis partner, Italy, against the British. The Italians flew planes of their
own against the British, machines quite different in design and performance.
The Italian Regia Aeronautica fought the war on the Axis side from June 10,
1940, to September 8, 1943. Many sources agree that the Regia Aeronautica’s assistance
to the Germans’ campaign against Great Britain in the Battle of Britain and against the
Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa was marginal. Italy’s campaigns in the
Mediterranean and North Africa, however, did inflict damage on the Allies. 17 The Italian
aviation industry produced fighters which possessed only limited power. Due to
inadequate availability of resources, Italy maintained a force of under-supplied and illequipped planes. Italian technology, despite Il Duce’s efforts to turn fascist Italy into a
modern world power, lagged far behind that of the world’s greatest powers; Italy as a
16
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nation faced a stark divide between its industrial North and undeveloped South. This
geographic dichotomy plagued the uniformity of its air forces. 18
The main Italian fighter aircraft companies, Macchi, Fiat, and Reggiane,
manufactured monoplane fighter planes by 1941. The performance levels of these aircraft
lagged behind those of British and German fighter planes. The Macchi C.200 Seatta,
operational in the autumn of 1941, had a Fiat radial engine capable of 870 hp. It could
accelerate to a top speed of 313 mph (503 km /hr.). 19 Although this seems fast by 1930’s
standards, a British Hawker Hurricane produced 1, 300 hp, with Rolls Royce engine
capable of 329 mph (529 km /hr). Even more of a contrast, the Supermarine Spitfire had
an engine output of 1,710 hp, with a top speed of over 408 mph, so the Italian fighter was
out-matched in terms of speed.

20

In aerial combat, speed and engine power is everything, the force that drives
evasive and aggressive maneuvers that decide life or death for a pilot. Italian planes were
outmatched and outgunned, so their pilots needed to find creative ways to shoot down
their technologically superior foes. Ingo Mario Castoldi designed the Macchi C.200
Saetta (Lightning) as Italy expanded its military during the mid 1930’s African
campaigns. Italy assigned one hundred and fifty-six C.200 Saettas to fly in the first
operational assignment against Malta, during June of 1940. 21 The Caporoni-Reggiane
was yet another fighter plane in Italy’s arsenal. Slightly faster than the C.200 Sertta, its
1,175 hp, liquid- cooled twelve cylinder Daimler-Benz engine allowed it to reach a top
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speed of 349 mph (563 km/hr). 22 The Italians armed the Caporoni-Reggiane moderately
with four machine guns, and the aircraft had an operational range of 684 miles (1,100
km). 23 These planes were well built, but were not as fast or as heavily armed as modern
war planes of other nations. However, their durability frequently allowed them to survive
aerial combat. Many of them could withstand a considerable amount of battle damage
and still return to their base. These Axis planes faced a mix of British planes. The British
only had a limited supply of their best fighter, the Spitfire, so they utilized many desertmodified Hawker Hurricanes. The British used many other outdated and varied type
aircraft ranging from obsolete biplanes to torpedo bombers against their enemies in North
Africa and the Mediterranean.
As the British engaged the Germans and the Italians, a new, unexpected “Axis”
force arose as the Americans began Operation TORCH - the Vichy French. After the
collapse of the French Armée de l’Air, when Germany conquered France, the Vichy
French Air Force survived in southern France and in the French North African colonies.
The finest fighter the French possessed, the Dewoitine D.520, could outmaneuver the
early model of the German BF-109 and match its speed. This well-armed French fighter
had a twenty mm cannon situated in its propeller block and four machine guns in its
wings; this decisively outgunned the American P-40. 24 Emile Dewoitine designed and
privately manufactured the plane in 1936, but the military did not adopt it until 1938. The
first prototype contained a flaw in its radiator. This caused serious overheating and
prevented a favorable top speed. The French later modified the Dewoitine 520 prototype
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allowed it to enter mass production by 1939. 25 A 930 hp Hispano-Suiza engine powered
the Dewoitine (D.520), enabling it to maintain a top speed of 326 mph (525 km/hr). 26
This single seat fighter plane boasted an impressive range of 605 miles (990 km), equal to
a considerable stretch of shoreline aside the North African desert. Over three hundred
D.520 aircraft survived the onslaught of the battle for France, and subsequently flew
mostly in North Africa. 27 The French plane’s full potential was restricted during the war,
since their manufacturers were either shut down by the Germans or maintained under
German directives.
The Axis fighters, along with the fighters flown by the Vichy French, were unique
in their technological characteristics by nation. The Germans possessed aircraft that were
generally superior to there of the British and American air forces. Out of all of the
nations’ air forces, however, the British aircraft proved to be the most diverse, with
capabilities of torpedo-bombing, interception, fighter-bombing, and strafing. Britain’s
vast empire and its ordeal in the Battle of Britain caused it to develop and modify not
only first-rate fighters, but also other aircraft. These played a vital role in the fight
involving convoys in the Mediterranean. Although it seemed as if no nation could
develop a fighter comparable to the German Messerschmitt BF-109, the British devised
one that came close to being its equal, the Spitfire. The British took special care in
developing its aircraft technology, so they ended up with more capable airplanes than the
United States. Furthermore, the well developed aviation technology allowed the RAF to
survive and develop strong tactics to succeed in the desert and over the Mediterranean.
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Chapter 3
Technology of the Allied Fighters

The RAF by 1940 possessed both excellent fighters and heavy bombers. Fighter
Command possessed two main fighter aircraft, the Hawker Hurricane and the
Supermarine Spitfire. These RAF fighters achieved fame when they provided the margin
of victory during the Battle of Britain. Sydney Camm designed the Hawker Hurricane in
1935 as a single-seat monoplane fighter aircraft capable of a top speed of 300 mph (483
km/h). 28 The Hurricane flew only a moderate range, since it held sixty-six gallons in its
two main fuel tanks with a reserve of twenty-eight gallons. This was greatly extended by
the addition of a drop tank which increased its fuel load to two hundred and seventy-four
gallons. 29 The Hurricane consumed fuel at a rate of roughly 56 gallons/hr. 30 Later models
were driven by better engines. The Hurricane’s speed increased steeply to 336 mph (541
km/h), with the addition of the Rolls-Royce, Merlin XX V-12 piston engine. The
aircraft’s design accommodated outward retractable landing gear, quite different from
those other planes of the era that retracted inwards. 31 Its landing gear was built wide and
stable to make the plane easier to land when it sustained heavy damage. Another
difference from other nations’ planes included the location of the Hurricane’s guns.
Unlike German fighters, whose armament was housed in the nose cowling, the
Hurricane’s wings housed its guns. British factories equipped this plane with an
28
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impressive number of guns, which varied by model. The Hurricane Mk 1 carried eight
7.7mm machine guns, while the later Mk IIB model boasted twelve, with six in each
wing. In North Africa, the RAF adopted different weapons to suit their needs in the
desert. The Hurricane Mk IID of the Desert Air Force had two 40mm anti-tank cannon,
enabling it to attack ground targets. 32 The Hurricane had a limited range of 460 miles
(740 km) confining it to a limited coverage area of operation.
Commanders cautioned the pilots assigned to fly above the desert regarding the
disadvantages of the Hawker Hurricane I in comparison to the BF-109. They said, “The
Messerschmitt has nearly a hundred miles an hour on us in level flight.” 33 Spirits sank
further, during a Desert Air Force briefing as the commander declared, “…and diving
down on us from God knows what altitude, they’d have all the advantage. Forget your
dreams of glory, Ed. Put on your red wig and your false nose and learn to be
inconspicuous. Save your energy for running away. That’s our game, I’m afraid.” 34 This
applied to the Hawker Hurricane Mk I. Improved models followed, but the BF-109 still
held a decisive advantage. Hurricanes, however, could easily overpower and destroy most
Italian fighters, so they were assigned that role in the desert and the Mediterranean. The
Hurricane was a classic, staple fighter for the RAF, which, however, needed a faster and
more maneuverable plane to compete with the updated German BF-109. Their answer
was the Supermarine Spitfire.
Evolved from the design of a high performance racing seaplane, the Spitfire
proved to be a decisive addition to the Royal Air Force. Reginald Mitchell designed the
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plane, beginning as a concept in 1933. Revised and refined many times, it became the
sleek, elliptical wing fighter that finally entered service in 1938. 35 The plane housed a
powerful Rolls-Royce Merlin II twelve cylinder, liquid-cooled engine that generated
1,030hp. The Spitfire Mark I clocked an impressive top speed of 355 mph (571 km/h),
which improved in later models to 374 mph (602 km/h). By the end of the war, the
Supermarine Spitfire Mk XIV raced through the skies at 448 mph (721 km/h). 36 Like the
Hurricane, it carried its guns in its wings. The Spitfire Mk I sported eight machine guns,
while the later model Spitfire Mk VB and all later versions were armed with four
machine guns and two twenty mm cannon. Most pilots favored the Spitfire over other
RAF fighter aircraft because it excelled in speed, maneuverability, and visibility.
Elsewhere, Britain employed a mix of fighters, often outdated, in the
Mediterranean and North Africa. The Boulton Paul Defiant Mk I proved an absolute
disaster during the Battle of Britain. Its slow speed proved detrimental, as did the rearfacing of all of its four machine guns. The aircraft design had the pilot flying the plane
and a gunner in a back-facing turret. This turned out to be a terrible arrangement; when
casualties mounted, the RAF learned the necessity of forward facing guns. The plane did
have limited uses in the desert, but remained vulnerable. The twin-engine Bristol
Beaufort existed as the RAF’s standard torpedo bomber. It contained a crew of four and
flew at a top speed of 265 mph (426 km/h). 37 First introduced in 1938, the plane was
effective against enemy shipping. Gun turrets in the nose and rear of the plane protected
it from enemy fighters. Beauforts, stationed on Malta in early 1942, attacked Axis
shipping bound for North Africa. Bristol manufactured another torpedo plane, the
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Beaufighter. This was a duel-engine plane with a crew of two, used by the RAF to attack
naval targets in the Mediterranean. It was relatively slow compared to other fighters, with
a top speed of 321 mph (516 km/h). Nevertheless, the Beaufighter became the preferred
choice for anti-shipping attacks, since it was faster than the Beaufort. The Beaufighter
demonstrated a workhorse capability and attacked ships effectively with its 2,127 lb (964
kg) torpedo. 38 This plane could also be fitted with eight, under-wing unguided rockets.
The Gloster Gladiator also performed as a torpedo bomber. An obsolete biplane dating
from 1937, the Gladiator had a Bristol Mercury, nine-cylinder, radial, air-cooled eight
hundred forty hp engine as its power plant. The plane was dangerously slow, for it could
only fly, at best, 253 mph (407 km/hr). 39 These planes did play a large role at Malta. The
Royal Air Force, equipped with high performance fighters, coastal torpedo fighters, and a
separate bomber command complete with heavy bombers, provided a comprehensive
aerial arsenal. The RAF utilized its diverse planes above the sea and desert.
Britain had an air fleet of varied fighters suited for air war of the early 1940’s.
America’s fighter aircraft early in World War II proved unsuitable. The British perfected
their planes to meet the challenges of the desert war. The British equipped the majority of
their air fighter units with Hurricanes and Spitfires. Although the RAF flew some
outdated aircraft, these were used ways that best utilized their strengths. The RAF’s
skillful and courageous pilots flew older planes to carry out torpedo strikes. Experienced
pilots were necessary for success in this role.
The United States military’s fighter units fell far behind British and German
military aviation at the breakout of World War II. America lacked experienced pilots and
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advanced fighter planes. American fighters couldn’t compete with the Luftwaffe’s BF
109s. The famed, North American P-51 Mustang was in its infancy as a planned aircraft
and did not mature in use to its superior status until later. Nor did the Army Air Corps fly
the P-47 Thunderbolt at this time. In its air arsenal in 1939, America had the Curtiss P36C and the Seversky P-35. The P-36 could barely maintain its top speed of over 300
mph, clocking out at 311 mph (500 km/hr). The P-36’s inaccurate guns were practically
useless since the plane could never fly to within range of the faster, well-armed enemy
planes piloted by veteran pilots. 40
By the time America entered the war, it had improved its attack aircraft. Its
mainstay fighter was the Curtis P-40 Warhawk, a direct development from the Curtis P36 Hawk, with many improvements. Some of these included a re-worked landing gear, a
thirty-caliber machine gun, and a carburetor with an added air-intake scoop. 41 Its
armament of one machine gun on each wing proved completely inadequate compared to
the heavily-armed fighters the rest of the rest of the world employed. Even Italian fighters
sported more firepower than the early P-40 Warhawk model. The P-40CU, the first
Warhawk model, had a maximum speed of 357 mph, completely deficient compared to
the Luftwaffe fighter. 42 This American plane’s speed came from an Allison V1710-33
engine with an output of 1,090 horsepower. This first Warhawk variation lagged far
behind the high standards of combat aircraft set by the Germans and the British. By
March of 1941, the P-40C, also known as the Tomahawk IIB by the British, incorporated
superior armament, but due to its added weight, flew slower than its preceding model.
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The P-40C could achieve a top speed of only 345 mph. 43The added machine guns were a
step in the right direction; it now housed two fifty-caliber machine guns in the nose with
four additional thirty caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. With this, the
Warhawk contained at least the firepower to compete with Axis planes. In 1941, delivery
of these new Tomahawks to the British made it possible for their use in North Africa to
fight against the Vichy French, Italian, and the Germans. The British added armament to
the plane to attack ground targets in the desert. The RAF quickly assigned the Tomahawk
fighters to ground attack missions. America built eight hundred and twenty-eight
Tomahawk IIB fighter planes and sent six hundred seventy-nine to the British and the rest
to aid Russia and China. 44 As time progressed, many modifications were made on those
American planes.
By the time of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the American engine
manufacturer Alison developed a more effective redesigned engine block for the P-40
that slightly increased its horsepower output from 1,090 to 1,150. 45 The P-40E models
used an Alison engine. Despite the more powerful engine, the plane went from
satisfactory to worse. The designers removed the two cowling machine guns to allow
room for the larger size of the engine block. This decreased firepower severely reduced
its utility as a fighter aircraft. The British renamed the plane the Kittyhawk due to its
extremely different design. Allison may have produced the best fighter engine produced
in America, but the British Rolls-Royce Merlin engine outperformed it since the Allison
experienced trouble performing at high altitudes. The British Merlin engine had a two-
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staged supercharger, generating an output of 1,300 horsepower. 46 The British outfitted
the P-40F with their Merlin engine, and this was the model American pilots flew in the
TORCH invasion. The manufacturer fitted the P-40F with six fifty caliber machine guns,
and the aircraft flew at a top speed of 364 mph. 47As this aircraft still did not reach the
standards of the top foreign fighter aircraft, American fighter pilots were at a
disadvantage when they first saw action.
Although not a fighter, the Piper L-4 Grasshopper, considered a great asset to the
Army Air Corps, flew as an aerial observer for artillery. The plane itself was a flimsy,
underpowered, unarmed deathtrap. The Army Air Corps soon discovered that using the
L-4 Grasshopper with its miniscule engine was a lethal mistake. A 65 hp, Continental O170 four-cylinder engine with a maximum speed of 85 mph (137 km/hr) powered the
plane. 48 The plane flew so slowly that it could not outrun enemy aircraft, and this allowed
for extended enemy exposure due to the increased time to arrive at a destination. Its range
was only 190 miles (304 km). Its civilian equivalent, the Piper Cub, remains a popular
plane in civil aviation today. Two major differences between the American Air Corps’
idea of aerial reconnaissance and the British were the horsepower and type of aircraft.
The British understood the vulnerability of reconnaissance aircraft. They used for
reconnaissance flights a modified Hawker Hurricane fitted with a camera and 1,030 hp to
allow for escape from threatening enemy fighters. 49 It had a range of 460 miles (740 km)
and was much better suited for covering ground than the American L-4 Grasshopper. 50
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In Operation TORCH, the Army Air Corps was not the only American source of
air power. The U.S. Navy played a large role in the operation and used the Grumman
F4F-4 Wildcat. The Wildcat took off from and landed on the deck of a carrier. By design,
it landed with the aid of a tail hook that caught the arresting cables on the carrier deck in
order to stop the plane. Manufacturers installed Pratt & Whitney R830-86 twin Wasp
radial engines that sported fourteen cylinders into the plane. The Wildcat’s air-cooled
engine produced 1,200 horsepower, allowing the plane to achieve a top speed of 318
mph, slow by fighter standards. 51 The plane looked tubby and awkward with its large
radial engine and fat elongated fuselage. The landing gear retracted into the sides of the
fuselage. The Wildcat’s armament included six machine guns, and the plane achieved a
flight range of 770 miles (1,240 km). The pilots considered the Wildcat’s weaponry one
of its best features. 52 Based on design and performance, however, the plane proved to be
ill-matched against the enemy fighters it soon faced. However, Wildcats played an
integral role in the assault on Casablanca and other areas during Operation TORCH.
America was in the process of building other more advanced planes for its arsenal, but
these were not available in time for the North African landings. 53
Most of the aircraft used during Operation TORCH were inferior to German and
British fighters with the exception of the twin-engine P-38 Lightning fighter, which was
used in some of the later landings of Operation TORCH and in the ensuing North African
campaign. 54 This American fighter had an unconventional design. The Lockheed P-38
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Lightning possessed a twin-engine, was twin-boomed, a single seat fighter capable of a
top speed of 414 mph (667 km/h). Two 1,475hp, Alison V-1710-111, liquid-cooled
engines propelled the plane to its comparatively fast speed. 55 The P-38 Lightning had
both positive and negative attributes, as did other fighters. According to Lightning pilot
C.L. “Kelly” Johnson, the Lightning was a well balanced fighter; he listed fifteen positive
points and fifteen negative points. 56 The guns, stacked and centered in the nose cone,
packed a heavy punch. The tires possessed an adequate size diameter and they showed a
configuration in a well-balanced tricycle gear layout. This pattern, according to the
maintenance manuals, lent itself to easy removal and replacement. The brake system,
which on other aircraft was quite difficult to replace, was simple to remove on the
Lightning due to its innovative design. Since the plane sat high, the maintenance crew
easily marked and determined slippage. The tall struts allowed a mechanic to duck under
and get a good look. This allowed for easy maintenance of the aircraft. 57 All of these
features helped the plane’s performance.
When describing the plane’s assets, the P-38 pilots said that the plane contained a
lot of power with its dual, supercharged engines, low basic drag, and great
maneuverability. The Lightning’s favorable slipstream effect also made it a delight to
Packard 12 cylinder engine with 1,400 hp and later, 1,510 hp to increase the P-51D model of the Mustang
to a top speed of 437 mph (703 km/hr).54 The “D” model was an improvement created from the previous
models. The manufacturer’s engineers achieved this development by examining flight results during early
campaigns. Another innovation the Americans added to the “D” model was a bubble canopy to provide
superb pilot visibility and an increased range of 950 miles (1,530 km). The extended mileage allowed the
plane to be one of the few fighters in the war possessing the capability to cover the bombers all the way to
the target.54 The “D” model did not arrive until later in the war. On the Navy side, the F4F Wildcat was
replaced by the F6F Hellcat in 1943. The Hellcat outperformed the Wildcat in almost every way. It was
carrier borne and served as a fighter mostly in the Pacific later in the war. These fighters did not see action
during operation TORCH.
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fly. 58 This, of course, depended on the engine working properly. On the opposite side of
the spectrum, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning encountered various engine problems,
including backfiring, cooling, and solid fuel flow problems. There were also problems of
comfort for the pilot, such as insufficient cockpit heat and a dangerous tail construction
when the pilot bailed out. 59 However, the cockpit, itself, was quite spacious by World
War II standards. The complexities of the P-38 Lightning presented a problem for the
novice pilots tasked to fly them in the limited missions assigned to the planes in the later
stage of Operation TORCH.
Having outlined the characteristics of the fighter aircraft used during the air war, I
briefly describe the equipment used by the pilots; regardless of the aircraft they were
assigned. Standard equipment for pilots of this era included six major components that
made up the flight gear. These included, but were not limited to: helmet, goggles, fire
resistant gloves, boots, parachute, and a “Mae West” (life preserver). Additional items
included an oxygen-connecting hose, a mouthpiece and radio. 60 The “Mae West” was
especially important when flying over bodies of water, such as the Mediterranean. The
pilots utilized charts for navigation. This set of gear, when teamed up with a fueled and
ammunition loaded plane, made air combat possible. Strapped into his seat and wearing
his equipment, the pilot required full access to the flight controls. British programs
trained their men to become proficient airmen. It took a well trained pilot to understand
how to incorporate twists and maneuvers in order to capitalize on an enemy’s mistake.
The hardware only allowed the platform and tools for combat as it took a skilled and
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determined pilot to manipulate the controls and transform the airplane into a weapon.
These complex maneuvers and pilot instincts played a major role in outsmarting their
opponent. This could only be learned from experience. American cadets’ lack of
exposure and lackluster training in the appropriate aircraft decreased their combat
effectiveness and put them at great risk. American pilots received fewer opportunities to
practice using their equipment in flight training than did the British, since they spent so
little time in their combat aircraft.
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Chapter 4
Britain’s Aviation Training Process

The performance deficiencies so evident among American pilots during Operation
TORCH revealed, to a significant extent, the flaws of their training in military aviation.
America’s military flight training program in 1942 contained an overburdened and
flawed protocol. Many new pilots went through the program without learning essential
skills. Corresponding training programs for RAF pilots were more thorough and allowed
for more flight time and a more comprehensive approach to the application of combat
flight skills and knowledge.
A comparison between the course training materials of the two nations is
astonishing, for the cadets of the RAF received far more detailed and in depth curriculum
covering several mathematical methods and applications of advanced navigation, weather
observation, and practical flight maneuvers than did their American counterparts. British
publications authored by aviation navigation experts such as David Hay Surgeoner and
mathematical pilot applications devised by A.F Buchan and R. Borthwick provided the
British with exceptional standardized training materials. With effective hands on flight
curriculum backed by excellent standardized texts, RAF cadets received outstanding
instruction regardless of their RAF school locations. The majority of British cadets either
learned to fly in Britain itself or was outsourced to replica schools established in Canada.
Accustomed to assembling and preparing aircrew of different nationalities, the British
used the same standardized training curriculum to train its pilots from all over Great
Britain and its empire as well as fellow foreign Europeans. The RAF system offered
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opportunities for new pilots to gain combat experience under the supervision of training
supervisors who were themselves veterans of air combat. This practice infused battle
proven techniques onto the new pilots. They gained further preparedness for the air war
by experiencing actual combat missions during training. At the same time, the RAF
avoided exposing these new pilots to high-risk operations. Veteran instructors
accompanied trainees on relatively safe combat assignments. This practice was quite
common. Geoffrey Moyer recalled that his training unit flew actual missions with novice
Australian and South African pilots. 61 This method taught trainees the fundamentals of
aerial combat by providing minimal exposure to actual live fire and real threats.
Frequently, these experiences instilled bravery, as well as confidence, in the airmen and
sharpened their mastery of aerial combat maneuvers. These qualities were difficult to
produce in classrooms alone. Trainees copied the actions of their veteran trainers. The
instructors not only looked after them, but also taught them how to complete their
missions safely. American pilots who trained in 1942 lacked this valuable experience,
since they had not flown on actual combat missions.
Flying an aircraft is a complex activity that requires great skill, knowledge, and
experience. Fighter pilots must know how to successfully and safely fly their aircraft,
navigate accurately in all weather conditions, and utilize a working knowledge of air
combat in order to fight and survive in the war. The American pilot training program
often failed to teach its pilots rudimentary but necessary flying skills, such as landing and
navigation. These deficiencies surfaced when American pilots failed to perform correct
landing procedures often crashing during their initial combat missions, including sorties
flown in Operation TORCH. Inexperience and lack of knowledge was the primary causal
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factor of most of these accidents. The American air elements suffered from a flawed
fighter pilot instruction system, while the RAF benefited from its own superior teaching
methods.
The British developed, by 1942, a high quality, standard combat pilot educational
system that, when combined with actual combat experience, produced superb pilots. They
established many training schools in Canada, as well as in Britain. The program
contained different levels to ensure that pilots mastered the mechanics of flying their
aircraft in both favorable and unfavorable weather conditions. From there, students
moved forward learning aerial maneuvers and combat tactics. Future RAF fighter pilots
started in the Initial Training Wing (ITW). During this period, ITW pilots learned
fundamentals of map reading, navigation, meteorology, airmanship, and aircraft
recognition. 62 Textbook manuals favored in 1942 for these British trainees included
David Hay Surgeoner’s First Principles of Flight, 1941 and Air Training Series
Navigation and Meteorology. 63 The latter focused heavily on skills of map reading and
calculations of position fixing to instruct a new pilot in navigation. 64 It was important for
the cadets to master these vital skills, because they focused on circumstances which could
cause accidents in combat. The American training schools failed to properly teach these
important skills. Aircraft recognition was important, for it prevented pilots from shooting
down friendly aircraft. Map reading and navigation proved essential, especially over the
desert and water where landmarks were scarce. This forced a pilot to rely on his
navigational skills by utilizing time, compass headings, and maps to determine his
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position. 65 At the ITW, British pilots not only learned these skills, but mastered them to a
point to where they could be effective in combat. Cadet graduates testified that they were
ahead of the curve thanks to the preparation provided by the ITW and seemed better
prepared than their American counterparts, who lacked such an effective initial training
phase. 66
From the ITW, the trainees moved on to the Elementary Flying Training School
(EFTS). At the EFTS, they flew often to acquire the fundamentals, gaining flight
exposure in all weather conditions and other situations. By intent, these maneuvers
demanded proficiency from the new pilots while flying their aircraft. To prevent friendly
fire, RAF cadets needed to pass an exam on aircraft recognition. It was vitally important
to recognize and recall the wing span of both friendly and enemy aircraft. 67 After the
EFTS, they moved to the Service Flight Training School (SFTS). The SFTS typically
lasted two and a half months, a period when new pilots flew first the Tiger Moth then the
Hawker Hurricane. The standard text for British instructors was the Air Publication
1732b, a standardized manual for instructors at the SFTS schools. It outlined step by step
methods for instructors to teach maneuvers and aerial gunnery. 68
The Tiger Moth, the primary aircraft used in the SFTS before pilots moved on to
the Hurricane or Spitfire, contained a relatively simplistic instrument panel with a dozen
gauges. Tiger Moths were the light aircraft used by the British and the Canadians for their
initial training. The Canadian Air Force, like the British, utilized constant flight training
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throughout the program and simultaneous ground courses. The Museum of Flight
graciously allowed me access to a rare, limited edition copy of David J. Carter’s
exhaustedly detailed work, entitled Prairie Wings. His book traced the historical
background of the established RAF bases in Canada formulated by the ‘”secret” diary of
personal stationed at Alberta’s Medicine Hat Air Base. It described the process of
training both British and Canadian fighter pilots. With a follow up visit to the Langley
airfield in British Columbia, I examined flyable, refurbished Tiger Moths. Based on
knowledge gathered from viewing the aircraft and its specifications, along with the
diaries included in Carter’s book, I learned that flying these planes and imitating combat
maneuvers occurred early in the training process. Their American counterparts, in
contrast, studied books and learned straight and level flight. 69
British SFTS trainees also benefited from flying the actual aircraft they would use
in combat after mastering the Tiger Moth, accumulating flight hours in either a Hurricane
or Spitfire. 70 The Tiger Moth’s speed and characteristics allowed the RAF cadets to
master technique before moving on. The combination of flying this particular aircraft
with their initial training in their assigned fighter made a significant difference for the air
trainees, since the trainees were exposed to their eventual combat plane and flying it
familiarized themselves with its unique speed and handling.
In combat, the British cadet pilot usually flew the Hurricane or Spitfire. When
RAF cadets flew these aircraft, they faced half a hundred controls and instruments. 71
After RAF trainees graduated from the SFTS, the final hurdle before going to war
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consisted of operations training, which taught and perfected their air combat abilities. 72
These multi-tiered levels of the British pilot training system ensured that its graduates
became well versed and ready for aerial combat. The system worked, and RAF pilots not
only employed a great number of useful skills during combat, but were also trained to
minimize accidents.
The British extended their training system to other areas within the
Commonwealth and Empire. The RAF sent many of their British pilots to Canada for
training, due to Canada’s vast spaces, extra resources and abundance of training aircraft
suitable for effective use. 73 England with its insular confines lacked the space required
for the scale of training needed. 74 Instructors, using planes like the Tiger Moth, taught
both British and Canadian cadets by employing the effective training structure the RAF
used in the British Isles. One exceptional difference between the Royal Canadian Air
Force (RCAF) and the RAF was that the latter kept its pilots’ accomplishments
anonymous, while the Canadians published the names of their pilots. 75
British cadet flight time was much more frequent compared to their American
counterparts. 76 British and the Americans did share a common training aircraft referred
by the RAF as the North American AT-6 Harvard, a plane also known as the Texan. 77
The Harvard, an American-made training aircraft, situated the pilot in the rear of the
aircraft. This differed from the front seat arrangement in the lighter Tiger Moth. These
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planes provided British pilots with the platform to quickly master the basics so that they
could move on to fly the actual combat aircraft. Their proper training on these machines
minimized training accidents even though accidents did occur. In Langley, British
Columbia, Canada, I was able to examine at the Canadian Museum of Flight the actual
training aircraft like the AT-6 Harvard restored to flying condition. Painted yellow in
order to serve as trainers so that the instructors and ground observers could spot them
from the ground the new pilots spent many hours learning combat maneuvers in these
aircraft.
According to Carter’s research, only sixteen members of the aircrew died due to
accidents on or near the Swift Current training bases situated in Saskatchewan, Canada.
This number is relatively low, and adverse weather conditions and failed landings caused
most of the incidents. 78 The Canadian-based schools effectively produced knowledgeable
pilots who could perform well in combat. The first forty-eight fighter squadrons
graduated from the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) schools managed thirty-one kills
in the Battle of Britain with only sixteen combat related losses. 79 Even though this was
only a 0.6 kill ratio per squadron, their achievements built up the new pilots’ experience.
This track record, compared to the disastrous performance of American airmen, shows
that the British and British Canadian air schools produced much more effective
personnel.
In contrast, American pilots spent most of their time flying under-powered
training aircraft and less of it in actual combat aircraft. The amount of time spent in a
combat aircraft contributed a great deal to the learning process. Normally, pilots
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improved their abilities by accumulating flight experience through repetition and logging
flight hours in their aircraft. A pilot arguably required more practice time in the combat
plane than he needed in the trainer to obtain proficiency for basic certification. When
American pilots graduated from their trainer aircraft to combat planes, they found it
necessary to relearn everything according to the specifications of the new aircraft. Pilots
needed to adjust to the difference in power, speed, and handling of new planes. Britishtrained pilots had made this shift much earlier, which gave them an advantage. The
American training program differed greatly from the British program and failed to deliver
skills, knowledge, and experience necessary for new pilots to survive in combat.
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Chapter 5
Insufficient American Training

On paper, the American training system appeared to indicate the skills needed for
a combat pilot. In actuality, it contributed to many accidents due to its flawed structure,
one that prohibited pilots from gaining enough knowledge and experience to be proficient
in flying complex combat aircraft. According to the official guide to the Army Air
Forces, AAF, a pilot’s duties included the following: “(a pilot) handles controls of plane
and commands aircraft; in addition, fighter pilot fires guns, navigates, communicates with
radio, sometimes directs and releases bombs.” 80 However, these skills were secondary
within the American structured pilot training, as America focused more on producing a
greater quantity of pilots, while sacrificing their quality. The official guide to the AAF
even admitted that, in 1941, the AAF Flying Training Command was small, outdated,
scattered, and loosely coordinated. 81 In 1942, it was split into two commands: the Flying
Training Command and the Technical Command. The British employed a more effective
regimental, three- tiered system. The Americans had a similar breakdown of different
levels, but their requirements were less skill-based, specific, or uniform than the RAF’s
programs. First, the American cadets learned the technical skills of flying. After
perfecting these skills, further training allowed them to fly combat aircraft. The cadets
spent more time on the technical and academic aspect of air combat than actually
practicing and perfecting their skills.
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The Army Air Force Pilot training process contained five levels of achievements.
First, cadet pilots attended a ten week course of preflight school studying physics, math,
and plane recognition. 82 To the British, this was time wasted. The RAF instructors used
preliminary training time to instill more practical knowledge of matters, such as
navigation and weather. 83 The British learned math, but only as it applied directly to
navigation and fuel consumption. 84 British texts on mathematics and navigation by David
Hay Surgeoner integrated their content to specific functions needed for aerial combat. 85
The British felt that knowledge of weather and navigation trumped the importance of
knowledge of physics for a new pilot. Unlike Surgeoner’s text, the American navigational
text approached navigation mathematically and lacked practical examples of applying the
navigational methods to actual sorties. The US FM 1-30 Air Corps Manual on Air
Navigation approached navigation with esoteric mathematical definitions and diagrams in
a condensed theoretical approach for determining position from bearings. 86 Thirty pages
were spent in the American navigational field manual on definitions, diagrams, formulas
and vague steps compared to a fleshed out British full text that included skill application
scenarios, practical navigational procedures, and several navigational aid options which
could be combined for better results. 87 The American field manual failed to prepare US
pilots to navigate the desolate coast of Morocco in 1942, whereas the British navigational
text instructed aircrew to adapt to their environment by taking bearing on landmarks,
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dead reckoning, and other practically applied navigational methods taught by Surgeoner.
By lessening focus on applied navigation, the American training programs contributed to
accidents during the early days of TORCH.
After the preliminary stage, American cadets entered Primary Flying School,
which also lasted ten weeks. Here, they spent seventy-five hours in underpowered,
outdated biplanes attempting to learn the fundamentals of flying. Acquiring proficiency
to fly a biplane was much easier than learning to pilot a combat monoplane capable of
flying over 300 mph. Under the American training system, school work and military
physical training on the ground supplemented the biplane flight exercises. Curiously,
pilots received physical training equivalent to that given to ground troops when their role
did not involve the same physical effort demanded for infantry. Time spent drilling
maneuvers could have been better spent practicing control manipulation and air
maneuvers.
After completing primary flight school, the future pilots entered Basic Flight
School. This level, like all others in the American training program, lasted ten weeks. At
this stage, trainees spent seventy hours flying faster planes with 450 horsepower engines.
These new planes were much faster than the 125 horsepower biplanes previously flown,
but still vastly underpowered compared to the aircraft the new pilots would fly in combat.
Much of this training continued on the ground; the trainees devoted forty-seven hours of
their time to military drill and devoted ninety-four hours to ground school. 88 Academic
work and military drill comprised two-thirds of the entire American training program,
leaving only a third of it available for flight experience. 89 The American training system
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lacked a central focus on flying, whereas, in the British system, flight training was the
principal emphasis.
As documented above, the American training system failed to provide sufficient
experience in the air. American trainees received far less exposure to their fighter planes
than their RAF counterparts. This was a major problem, because training on such aircraft
was a vital part of producing proficient aircrew. Additionally, American flight training
programs were overcrowded with students in 1940-1942; this decreased the effectiveness
of their instructors. 90 The number of student pilots increased so quickly that the
established training institution struggled to accommodate them. In 1939, the United
States government set a goal of producing 1,200 military pilots a year. This number
jumped to 7,000 in 1940, and further to 30,000 in February of 1941. 91 Since only a
limited number of trained instructors and administrators were available, this steep
increase made adequate instruction difficult. To meet the demand, new facilities were
necessary in order to accommodate these large numbers. The time spent constructing new
establishments and expanding old schools hindered the escalating American training
programs. Planes needed to be stored and taxied around the makeshift, often temporary,
structures used as training facilities. 92
As mentioned earlier, many hours of flight training in the American program took
place on the ground, in aircraft simulators. The Link Trainer was a mechanical box in
which the pilot sat and learned to fly by operating the gauges swiveling on gyros. 93 These
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extremely primitive simulators gave a student pilot practice only with instrumentation.
The machines had a limited axis of movement, which prevented the cadet from practicing
complex combat maneuvers, allowing only for aspects of basic flight. 94 Since no
projection of a simulated reality appeared, the pilot blindly moved the controls and
speculated his imaginary attitude and position by both the gauge indicators and the
limited movement of the box. 95 The Link originated in the late 1930’s and, after many
modifications, became the ANT-18 model. This machine simulated the North American
AT-6. For the first time, a simulator trainer had the characteristics and personality of a
specific aircraft programmed into the electronics. 96
As mentioned earlier, when the cadet moved on to Advanced Flying Training,
flying occupied only seventy hours out of the ten week training schedule. The trainees
flew six hundred horsepower, single engine AT-6s. This compared unfavorably to enemy
fighters which generated over 1,000 horsepower. 97 While the British and the Canadians
also used the AT-6, they did so much earlier in the training process. 98 Equipment for
advanced navigation used such as directional gyro were important and taught briefly in
the Pilots Manual and in alternative publication in 1940, intended for training civilian
pilots but also adopted for fighter pilot hopefuls. 99 Furthermore, when the American
pilots graduated from Advanced Flying Training, little time remained for them to adapt to
their new aircraft. The program allotted AFT graduates ten hours to fly their actual
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combat aircraft within a five week transitional period. 100 Only then did the new pilots fire
the aircraft’s guns. The American Army Air Corps grouped into fighter teams flying
either P-40s or P-38s. Their time spent on the ground reduced potential flight time, which
was insufficient for war beyond acquiring a basic familiarity of aircraft handling. Much
more time was necessary then allotted to improve performance and familiarity of
complex aerial maneuvers. Due to this, the potential for air accidents increased.
Accidents were so frequent during the American pilot training process that the
Regional Safety Organization (RSO) launched a campaign of safety awareness and
improvement. The RSO began this campaign through posters with visual warnings
depicting accident cases. One such poster featured an airplane tail sticking out of a
wrecked house with a caption noting, “A very hot pilot? A very hot pilot was Henry
Hightowers who boasted of having three hundred hours. To prove this claim, he dove on
his girl’s house one day and crashed. They would have been married the fifteenth of
May.” 101 Interestingly, accidents such as these continued to occur, caused by
hotheadedness or cocky attitudes. Other captions on other safety awareness posters were
closer to reality: they depicted emotional pilots unable to complete maneuvers. A hole in
the ground by the airport hangers is labeled with “The stupid droop, gander my lads at the
stupid droop, who knew he could manage an outside loop; halfway around it he crumpled
a wing and muffed his yank on the ripcord ring.” 102 Such mishaps continued in combat
when ill-trained American pilots conducted flight missions over North Africa. During the
opening days of Operation TORCH, inexperienced American fliers ended up suffering
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higher non-combat losses than the number of them shot down by enemy actions. The
American Air Corps considered accidents a normal part of life at the Falcon training
base. Thirty fatalities resulted from aviation accidents at Falcon. 103 The RSO recognized
that the quick growth of the program impaired its ability to adequately train pilots. This
also increased the incidence of training accidents. Such statistics should have raised
concerns, as the number of American military airplane pilot deaths increased by three
hundred and fifteen percent during 1942. 104
American pilots experienced more landing mishaps as well as mid-air collisions
and failures to execute maneuvers correctly than did their British counterparts. 105 Seventy
percent of the British fatalities occurred when their pilots attempted to land. 106
Nonetheless, an unorthodox landing was a rare sight, for example, for the Southern
Rhodesian cadets enrolled in British standardized training format. One did occur when
two Tiger Moths collided during a training landing on May 14, 1942. The pilots executed
the right technique, but failed to allow for the cross wind. Thanks to the safety and
thoroughness of British training, only one of the four airmen involved experienced
injuries. 107
Realizing that the American Air Corps experienced so many problems due to
aircraft accidents in pilot training, the British feared that the Americans would perform
poorly in combat, possibly to the point of becoming a liability to the Allied forces. Would
American pilots learn from the many mistakes they had made in training, or would the act
of sending accident-prone, under-trained pilots into combat lead inexorably to disasters in
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combat? The British knew that the Luftwaffe was a powerful foe. During earlier battles,
RAF pilots discovered tactics that allowed them to compete with faster and more
maneuverable German planes. Could American pilots with no combat experience and
poor training records become combat effective? The RAF needed more planes and pilots
to combat the Axis. Lend Lease alone was not enough to defeat Germany. After Pearl
Harbor, America was mobilizing for war and, one way or another, Great Britain sought to
utilize its gigantic ally’s manpower, planes, and supplies. America had to quickly adapt
its methods and acquire experience in order to fight alongside the British. One of the
most difficult problems Great Britain and America faced was how to transmit British air
tactics acquired through combat to the Americans.
Operation TORCH involved the United States Army Air Force. This meant that
underpowered and outclassed American built planes and inexperienced American pilots
would fight in North Africa. The result shared much similarity to the difficulties the
amphibious ground forces experienced, as Rick Atkinson recounted in his work, An Army
at Dawn. Low standards for both American pilots and ground forces presented a problem
when their units needed to be integrated with British troops and fighter squadrons which
were much better trained. These low standards presented an even bigger internal problem
as many accidents resulted. This is not an aberration in the history of American military
history, which had a long legacy of using poorly trained militia or soldiers in combat. The
American tradition was the exact opposite of the British long-standing policy of keeping
well-trained professional soldiers. The ideology of using a militia of loosely-trained
ordinary citizens driven to volunteer to defend the nation continued into World War II.
The concepts and technology of World War II were new, for no significant American
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record existed of naval aviation before World War II. The United States hadn’t used
carriers in combat prior to World War II, and the American military was still
experimenting with this new technology.
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Chapter 6
Air Tactics: The Competing Methods of Air Combat

Knowledge of dog-fighting tactics prepared a pilot to destroy enemy aircraft and
survive aerial combat. British pilots acquired modified tactics of aerial warfare through
the dogfights they fought during the Battle of Britain. Pilots discovered new fighting
methods: tricks such as approaching enemies out of the sun to catch them by surprise,
swooping in from above to maximize speed, and utilizing sharp banks and loops to evade
an attacker. 108 RAF pilots frequently used deflection shooting and with great success.
This tactic coordinated shooting at an enemy in relation to the speed and angle of the
shot. Another shooting skill included leading the target, which involved the distance the
enemy traveled before the bullets reached his plane. The shooter aimed and fired ahead of
the target to score hits.
The original Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual, issued in 1939 to RAF
pilots in its revised form, updated the fundamentals of air combat tactics, illustrated and
explained a series of maneuvers. These included, but were not limited to, the barrel,
continuous, climbing, gliding, flick, the upward rolls the cartwheel, the flick turn, and the
falling leaf exercise. 109 These exercises required specific control, speed, attitude, and
altitude conditions. Through experience, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe improved their
performance effectiveness in aerial combat. As the Americans remained neutral until the
end of 1941, their pilots lacked such opportunities to practice and develop tactics in
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combat. This was one reason why American air units lacked basic tactical skills for
Operation TORCH.
The German Luftwaffe included superior fighter pilots, who refined combat
tactics developed during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The Luftwaffe saw this as
an opportunity to experiment with different maneuvers. As stated earlier, the British also
developed seasoned veteran pilots during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Such experienced
pilots were an extremely important asset in aerial combat.
The RAF utilized, initially, a specific fighter formation. Its pilots flew in “vics,” a
compacted, close, flying formation of upside Vs of three planes. This actually proved to
be a disadvantage because the pilots lost situational awareness in this close formation.
The British improved their tactics by studying German flight patterns utilized in the
summer of 1940. The Luftwaffe fighter formation provided better coverage and
flexibility for dog fighting, compared to Allied aerial patterns. Germany utilized a “finger
of four” formation aligned in which they called a Schwarm, where planes lined up
staggered in parings. This formation, called the Rotten, set the leader of each independent
pair on the left side of the paring. The two fighters could maneuver independently,
allowing for flexibility and maximum potent attack options. 110 The difference between a
Schwarm and a Rotten is that the latter is an enforced version with two independents
pairings working together as larger unit formation. The flexibility of the Schwarm and
Rotten gave Luftwaffe pilots a slight edge over the RAF.
One advantage the Allied ace fighter pilots enjoyed over their Axis counterparts
was that the number of sorties flown was limited to one hundred before they were
reassigned to instruct new pilots. The Americans adopted this practice later in the war.
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German pilots did not enjoy this luxury. Rather, the policy for German fighter pilots was
“fly-till-you-die.” They stayed in continuous service unless killed or injured in a way that
inhibited their flying. Erich Hartmann, the war’s top fighter ace, flew 1,250 combat
sorties in which he scored 352 kills. 111 For this reason, Luftwaffe pilots accumulated as
many as one thousand sorties; successful super ace fighter pilots claimed an astonishing
numbers of kills. The Axis threat in North Africa caused the British to devise new
methods of aerial warfare.
The RAF found it necessary to expand its tactics beyond fighter and bomber
interception. It needed to develop successful methods of attacking enemy ships from the
air. It was also important to gather vital reconnaissance information in order to give the
ground forces better situational awareness of the location and intentions of the enemy.
The RAF utilized the protective cover of night to organize its fighters. The British
utilized information learned about the capabilities of its aircraft to apply their planes to
new uses as they shifted units and operations to the Mediterranean and the North African
desert.
America’s folly when it entered operations in this desert, contrasted with the
RAF’s operational transition from the British homeland to the Mediterranean and North
Africa. Decisions relative to leadership, aircraft usage, facilities, and air tactics benefited
its adaptation to their new theater. The RAF made use of existing tactics and developed
new ones. These included torpedo bombing, night fighting, and aerial interception. I
believe these additional conventions hardened the RAF into an elite air force, one with a
greater attack and defense capacity. British air power made a difference in the outcome of
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the campaign, as they diminished enemy supplies and provided situational awareness of
the battlefield from the air. 112
After Great Britain’s survival in the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Ministry
shifted gears as it re-assigned units to North Africa and the Mediterranean. Sir Hugh
Dowding pointed to his pilots’ advantages over the Luftwaffe during the 1940 Battle of
Britain. He said that the home advantage allowed for easier repair and recovery of most
of the planes and pilots shot down. As the British replaced or repaired the planes, their
surviving pilots undertook other missions. 113 In contrast, the vast distance over
inhospitable terrain in the desert was equally hard on both sides, especially when aircrews
survived crashes and the harsh desert conditions. Pilots carried desert survival gear; if
they lived they either ended up in POW camps or were rescued by their ground forces.
Dangers like scorpions, sandstorms, and heat exhaustion faced downed pilots on the
vastly barren North African mainland. Well-trained pilots shot down often crash landed
their planes in such a way that the trivial damage sustained by the plane could be repaired
and it could be put back into service. As the British replaced or repaired their planes, their
surviving pilots flew new missions.114 North Africa tended to be different as crash sites
were, frequently, too remote for retrieval and repair.
The Royal Air Force began to perform offensive maneuvers in mid 1941 and,
simultaneously, balanced defensive and offensive operations on Malta and over the
Mediterranean. 115 The RAF overcame the logistical obstacles of ferrying aircraft to
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Africa through U-boat infested waters of the Mediterranean. At this time, it needed to
find new leadership after the Air Ministy fired Sir Hugh Dowding. Dowding had proved
that he was an exceptional leader of the Royal Air Force; however, his defensive
strategies and policies were not suitable to the North African front. In addition to new
leadership for the monumental task of implementing an effective attack strategy, the RAF
also needed logistical support. These called for a leader with the ability to organize and
run the operation of securing and operating makeshift, under-supplied, desert air bases
that constantly changed location with the forward advance. This was a logistical and
operational nightmare. London appointed Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore to resolve
it. 116 Longmore focused on improving the maintenance and serviceability of airplanes
and vehicles. He put together tactical units of fighters. 117 Longmore faced an inherent
problem in the command structure in place in the Middle East. Delay of orders from
London slowed down the efficiency of the Desert Command. Political command required
implementing war decisions quickly enough to be effective. To solve this problem,
London on June 28, 1941, appointed Oliver Lyttelton as Minister of State in the Middle
East. This allowed the war cabinet to be represented in the Middle East and their
decisions to be executed without delay. 118
Operations in the desert continued to create challenges for the command staff.
Longmore encountered problems due to limited supplies and did a poor job of
coordinating his attacks. While his forces faced poorly performing Italian units,
Longmore failed to provide British ground units enough air cover. They struggled also
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against the Afrika Korps led by Erwin Rommel, the “Desert Fox.” Longmore’s first
Deputy Air Operations Chief was Air Marshal O.T. Boyd, who met an unexpected fate.
When he flew to North Africa in November of 1940 to assume the deputy command, his
plane came under attack by Italian fighters and crashed in Sicily. He survived, but
became a POW. 119 The deputy position was vacant until filled by Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Tedder. Tedder had an important role to play, for he unseated Air Chief Marshal
Longmore and became one of the RAF’s most successful air chief marshals.
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Chapter 7
Air Marshal Tedder Gives the RAF Jagged Teeth

Air Chief Marshal Arthur William Tedder implemented basic changes to Royal
Air Force organization and tactics in North Africa that assured it an offensive edge.
Based on secondary literature concerning Tedder and his memoirs, published as Air
Power in War, I provide an in depth analysis of Tedder’s policies and how they effected
the RAF’s action above the desert. The three principles in his doctrine of air power
incorporated concentration, flexibility, and mobility. 120 Their application greatly
increased the performance and effectiveness of the RAF in North Africa. Bombing and
fighter efforts were no longer “parceled out,” a disastrous strategy employed by his
predecessor. Instead, Tedder combined and concentrated his air forces in a way that
reflected his thee principles, which also allowed more effective Allied cooperation. He
realized that concentrating Allied forces was a necessary step towards victory, since
unified command facilitated maximal use of available resources. Tedder‘s leadership not
only streamlined operations, but promoted strafing and bombing runs against enemy
supply convoys. Under Tedder, the RAF functioned defensively and offensively.
Tedder’s second principle demanded that all squadrons became extremely
flexible. He wanted each to be proficient in all types of aerial missions and able to switch
between them at a moment’s notice. 121 He aimed to achieve skilled performances by his
air crews in air/sea attacks, communication, reconnaissance, interception, defensive
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cover, tactical ground assault, and strategic attacks. Types of targets selected varied
greatly from mission to mission. Pilots could be assigned to attack land communications,
shipping ports and cargo vessels, or enemy defensive positions or support ground attacks
by attacking enemy forward positions and covering the advance. 122 Once again,
experience and training enhanced the RAF’s versatility in aerial operations.
Tedder’s final cardinal principle, mobility, differed greatly from Sir Hugh
Dowding’s tactics during the Battle of Britain. Sir Hugh depended on readiness. He
placed organized squadrons in specific positions in England that allowed them to
scramble at a moment’s notice and attack Luftwaffe formations with the aid of radar
ground controllers. 123 In the North African desert, this would have failed and caused the
airfields to be temporarily out of commission, as the Luftwaffe bombed the forward
stations. Conversely had the British applied Tedder’s strategy, as discussed below, to the
Battle of Britain, half of the RAF’s resources could have been transferred to a safer
location to immediately counterstrike the enemy. 124
Tedder faced a rapidly changing front in an undersupplied desert environment and
operated without the aid of an advanced network of radar stations. He completely
changed the mobility and organization strategy of his predecessor in favor of a plan
tailored to the RAF’s new operational environment. He discarded unneeded equipment to
expedite operations from the mobile air bases. His plan also minimized the ground
support staff. These bases were easier to relocate to forward positions. 125 The greater
flexibility of the mobile air bases in the desert under Tedder gave the RAF an advantage
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by not limiting the units to a fixed area of operations. During the Battle of Britain, the
amount of support ground staff was extensive, including communicators and radar
operators. It proved close to impossible to relocate all of these resources. 126 Tedder
divided the ground staff into two; half of them were posted to a group prepared to move
to a forward position and the other half left to operate the air base. 127 Tedder arranged
proportions in such a way that two distinct and fully operational air bases could be
established and maintained. This allowed the British to occupy forward airfields and
quickly staff them. As the front line moved and the RAF acquired new airfields, it
conserved precious fuel by shortening the flying distance to enemy targets.
The RAF tasked Tedder with a variety of missions to prepare for the crucial
Second Battle of El Alamein. It demanded detailed information regarding the locations of
enemy positions through reconnaissance, all the while preventing the enemy from
locating British positions. The RAF also sought to eliminate Axis bombing attacks on
Allied shipping carrying supplies and reinforcements through the Mediterranean. 128 The
next step, equally important, was to attack Axis shipping lines and land convoys to
prevent Rommel from obtaining adequate supplies for his units in Western Libya,
Cyrenaica, and Tunisia. 129
The British used their island colony of Malta as a strategic position, one that
offered them an ideal strike capability on Axis shipping en route from Italy to North
Africa. The island served as an offensive stronghold with a submarine base and units of
Wellington bombers and Beaufighter fighter planes. These aircraft decimated Axis
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shipping. 130 As the situation in Malta under Axis air attacks worsened, Tedder devised
ways to strike at the enemy’s supply line. On the African side, British Beaufighters
became the leading fighter-bombers to combat attacks on Rommel’s supply columns of
Opel trucks and supply depots containing food and ammunition. 131 Tedder turned next to
attacking Axis troops, by bombing and strafing their lines and bases with British fighters.
RAF fighter bombers attacked Axis air fields at El Daba, Fuka, and Maaten Bagush. 132
These missions proved vital to the outcome of the Battle of El Alamein. Rommel
attacked the Eighth Army with a depleted force and was defeated due in part to British air
operations. The RAF integrated strategic and tactical missions under a cohesive unified
command, controlled and coordinated air strikes, and defense and reconnaissance
missions. 133 This contrasted with American forces’ movements, which separated their air
force by function from ground units, and failed to connect its air arm to operations by its
ground forces.
Due to soured Anglo-French relations in 1942, the British decided that the
Americans would be better suited to deal with the territory held by the Vichy French.
The North African theater was split into areas, each assigned to commanders reporting to
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. American
General Carl Spaatz ran the joint Anglo-American Northwest African Air Force, which
divided into three subdivisions consisting of coastal, strategic, and tactical commands.
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Pugh Lloyd headed the coastal command, responsible for
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attacking, shipping, and protecting its vital ports. 134 General James Doolittle, with his
much publicized background in bombers, headed the strategical command. The African
campaign used mostly the last of the three subdivisions. Coningham headed the tactical
command and later joined with the Desert Air Force, commanded by Air Commodore
Harry Broadhurst. This occurred after the tactical air force finished supporting the Eighth
Army on the ground. The tactics successfully employed by the British allowed them to
disrupt enemy convoys, defend strategic positions, and maintain Allied air superiority
over the desert.
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Chapter 8
Hunting Convoys: The RAF’s Offensive Successes

Logistics was the key to fighting in the desert. Due to its vast distances supply
lines were easily overstretched. Rommel overstretched his; lack of support rendered his
forward units vulnerable. Supplies needed to be shipped from Axis controlled ports and
moved by truck convoys through the desert to the ground troops. These convoys were
inviting targets to the British Desert Air Force. It struck Axis convoys and depots;
consequently Rommel faced shortages of ammunition, food, oil, and other supplies. The
close proximity of the British-held airbases on Malta to Italian shipping supply routes
gave the former great strategic importance. Between August 27 and September 4 of 1941,
Royal Air Force aircraft based on Malta sank six Italian cargo ships en route to resupply
Axis troops in North Africa. Later, another three ships were sunk by British submarines
and sea mines. 135
The RAF skillfully struck enemy shipping, despite the outdated aircraft available
to them. Its pilots were proficient night fliers. The Fleet Air Arm and the 830 Squadron
records reveal the great impact of Malta-based torpedo planes. Their attacks on Axis
convoys greatly diminished the amount of supplies reaching the enemy. The 830
Squadron flew Fairy Swordfish and Albacore torpedo bombers. Although slow and
obsolescent, these planes proved to be effective in sinking enemy vessels, especially
under the cover of night. By 1942, their efforts sunk 400,000 tons of Axis shipping,
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hampering Rommel’s efforts in the desert. 136 Swordfish aircrews operated outdated and
under-serviced equipment yet still managed to sink their targets. Later in the year, the
British ran into more and more opposition from escort destroyers and suffered increased
Swordfish losses.
On January 27, 1941, Sub-Lieutenant Pat Chambers flew as the lead pilot of a
flight against Axis convoys in the Mediterranean. This sortie consisted of six Swordfish
biplanes, each armed with a torpedo. At an altitude of 10,000 feet, Chambers spotted a
convoy of German ships steaming towards the African mainland. 137 Twelve miles from
the water-borne targets, the airplanes hooked a wide turn. This maneuver expended much
time, due to the slow turning radius of his aircraft. Nonetheless, the Sub-Lieutenant
released his torpedo after his systematic dive, and it sank a 3,950 ton German merchant
ship registered under the name Ingo. 138 Chambers’ wing man, Campbell, bombed the
cruiser Duisburg, the Ingo’s 7,500 ton escort. Their attack exemplified the Royal Air
Force’s successful tactical attacks on Axis shipping. The six planes were lucky, since the
slow Swordfish biplane presented a vulnerable target to all Axis fighter types.
Fortunately too for the British attackers, the German ships lacked sufficient air defense
guns. This and other successes against Axis shipping ensured that Rommel’s units ran
short of supplies. Also, these missions gave British pilots experience in advanced tactics
of aerial warfare against ships. American pilots lacked such opportunities to gain skills in
combat prior to Operation TORCH. This difference elevated the British pilots into a class
above American pilots, not only in combat experience, but in versatility of aerial combat
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skills. British actions against German convoys greatly benefited the Eighth Army, their
ground forces fighting in the desert campaign.
Efforts of the Royal Air Force against Axis supply line set back Rommel’s
advance. Lack of fuel stopped or delayed Rommel on multiple occasions. Logistics is the
lifeblood of all military operations. The RAF sank or damaged a crucial amount of
shipping. According to Craven, the British air effort attacked Rommel’s supplies so
thoroughly on one occasion that only three days of rations for his units remained. This
misfortune affected his attack from El Agheila in January 1942, as it forced Rommel to
supplement his meager supplies by capturing or raiding British supply dumps. 139 As the
amount of supplies reaching German ground troops diminished, they resorted to drastic
and risky alternative measures increased.
One of these involved Junkers Ju-52 transport planes. The Germans loaded them
with supplies and flew them across the Mediterranean to Africa. These aircraft normally
deployed paratroops. Revealed in a series of archival photographs, the packing of the Ju52s reflected creativity on the part of their German crews. They positioned ammunition
belts around drums of fuel and stacked boxes of supplies to maximize their load. 140 The
Luftwaffe accumulated stocks of aircraft fuel in Cyrenaica to support Rommel’s
approaching May 26th offensive, but, due to its prolonged scale, that supply quickly
evaporated. Pressure from Allied attacks on Axis shipping hindered their resupply effort
to such an extent, that the Afrika Korps’ supplies were exhausted by the end of June. This
also forced the Luftwaffe to downsize its air effort. 141
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Without fuel and ammunition, a modern army could not operate efficiently. In this
case, the Afrika Korps was over-extended and vulnerable to air attack. Still, Rommel
needed fresh supplies. In August of 1942, provisions dispatched to re-supply Axis forces
in North Africa amounted to 100,000 gross tons. The RAF, USAAF, and the Royal Navy
sank 80,000 tons, four-fifths of it. Allied air forces alone accounted for forty percent of
this loss. 142 This was due, in part, to RAF attacks against Axis ports. Harbors presented
choice targets for air attacks. They were often set ablaze and temporarily rendered
unusable for handling cargo ships.
Britain’s government saw that the tactical air policies implemented by Tedder for
attacking Rommel’s supplies produced results against Rommel, but the British took the
good news with reserve. According to one official British source, a report from Mollie
Panter-Downs in London War Notes, dated September 13, 1942, London’s attitude
towards the likelihood of defeating Rommel remained optimistic, even though the British
realized the “Desert Fox” would persist in his efforts against the Eighth Army. 143 The
public was more pessimistic due to earlier misinformation it had received concealing
British setbacks at the hands of the Afrika Korps in the desert. Specific evidence
regarding Malta indicated the effectiveness of Royal Air Force efforts there. Although the
public lacked a precise understanding of the severity of damage suffered on Malta
from Axis air attacks, they were informed of the courageousness and of the RAF pilots
and air defense units on the island.
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Chapter 9
The Experiences of the Desert Air Force

The superior quality of pilots in the RAF derived in part from their defensive air
maneuvers, which resulted in their high survival rate. Combat perfected RAF tactics. Its
pilots developed into war-hardened veterans. The desert campaign developed some
exceptional leaders in the RAF, such as fighter pilot and squadron leader George Barclay.
Barclay took over command of No. 238 Squadron in the El Alamein campaign. A bold
leader, likable to his crew and fellow airmen, Barclay was a model RAF officer. Seeking
to perfect his air combat performance, he worked out wing formation tactics and
strategies in his diary. 144 His diary, combined with operations records books provides
insight into his experience.
Promoted on October 3, 1941, to Flight Lieutenant, he transferred to Hornchurch
where he assumed command Flight No. 611 Squadron, a unit that later played a
significant role in the First Battle of El Alamein. 145 Barclay and his squadron arrived
ahead of their supplies and planes at Maryut, Egypt. As the planes arrived and the
squadron readied itself for operations, the situation in Tobruk deteriorated so badly that
its garrison surrendered to the Germans on June 19, 1942. The loss of Tobruk forced the
8th Army to retreat east behind the El Alamein lines. 146 The British 238th faced a
seasoned, well-equipped enemy in the struggle for air supremacy. The Luftwaffe’s
veteran aces, equipped with superior fighters, inflicted heavy losses on Barclay’s
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squadron. Barclay himself died in action on July 17, 1942, leading flight of Hurricanes
against a group of twelve J-87 Stukas protected by fighter escort. Despite Barclay’s
defensive maneuvers, a BF 109 shot him down. 147 From his diary, we learn how British
fighter leaders utilized their extensive knowledge in combat.
These gallant RAF pilots fought well but needed American pilots to reinforce
their strength during North African campaign. A technical problem delayed the American
air units scheduled to arrive in North Africa by the end of June 1942 to assist the RAF
Desert Air Force. These units flew missions without support from their ground and
maintenance personnel. This forced the British to allocate maintenance personnel to
service the newly arrived Americans. 148 This burdened Tedder, who already limited the
number of ground personnel in order to make bases flexible and easy to relocate. He
acted to increase their number. 149
Britain’s efforts to integrate inexperienced American pilots into their units caused
real problems. Despite the difficulties these allies attempted to work together and
established a joint headquarters to command both ground and air forces. The
commanders of the British Eighth Army and Western Desert Air Force cooperated in
targeting Axis forces. Within the Western Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur
Coningham led the No. 211 Group, which included fighter squadrons. The RAF sent
Royal Engineers to build forward aerodromes, protected by armored-car units and antiaircraft guns. Sir Arthur’s group flew Hurricane fighters, as well as obsolete American P-
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40 Tomahawks and the improved Kittyhawk fighters. 150Tedder kept his force as mobile
as possible to maintain its flexibility for attacking targets of opportunity. The American
66th Fighter Group participated in operations leading up to the second El Alamein Battle,
late in 1942. The 57th Fighter Group and 12th Bomber Group trained and worked in
cooperation with RAF units. 151 Unfamiliar with combat over the desert and fresh from
training, the Americans seemed, nonetheless, eager to fight. Their units faced many
obstacles.
The Italian forces in North Africa continued to experience humiliating defeats
stretching back to the beginning of their African campaign in mid-1940. The Italian Air
Force lacked the experience and advanced planes the Luftwaffe enjoyed. A postwar
Italian source reveals that Mussolini’s air force suffered from underdeveloped planes and
inefficient organization. 152 Their best fighter plane, the Macchi MC 200, came closest to
equaling the British Hawker Hurricane. 153 Italy’s poor performance prompted Hitler to
provide assistance. Luftwaffe units arrived in North Africa. The Hawker Hurricane,
superior to Reggio Aeronautica planes, then faced the better performing BF109. The
Hurricane was vulnerable due to its wing-mounted main fuel tanks. A single hit could
ignite the sloshing combustible liquid, which could envelop the pilot in a tunnel of
flames. 154 This resulted in heavy losses on the British side. When the Luftwaffe shot
down one RAF pilot on September 14, 1941, he escaped the wreckage severely burned
and was taken prisoner. The Luftwaffe unit involved wrote his squadron a note disclosing
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the condition of Lt. Byers and that he would recover in a German hospital in Derna. 155
The Germans under Rommel generally treated British prisoners of war with respect.
British pilots, when healed and liberated, often flew again.
The turning point in the fight for air supremacy occurred during the Crusader
offensive in late 1941. The RAF used the addition of high flying Spitfires its advantage.
When the Eighth Army struggled on the ground at El Alamein, RAF fighters relinquished
their original objectives to focus on Axis bombers. The first RAF squadron to arrive and
fight in the first Battle of El Alamein, the misused 73rd Squadron, was ordered to strafe
Axis ground units relentlessly. 156 Later, the Desert Air Force improved its tactics in order
to provide greater assistance to the ground troops. Axis aircraft frequently disrupted
Allied efforts in assisting the army. BF109 units shot down 1,400 British planes between
April 1941 and December 1942, while the RAF claimed 1,200 kills and the USAAF
another fifty. Even though the Luftwaffe shot down more planes, neither side fully
achieved air superiority, due to their immense losses. Axis aircraft losses on the ground
far exceeded Allied losses. During Crusader, the British pilots in combat above the desert
adopted, successfully a variation of the finger of four formations, using the German
tactics. 157 When attacking convoys, the British used a technique called the defensive
circle. This tactic proved effective until the German ace, Hans-Joachim Marseille,
discovered a way to turn it into a death trap for British pilots.158
The Luftwaffe’s high numbers of air kills were achieved mostly by a few expert
aces, particularly Hans-Joachim Marseille. He alone shot down one hundred fifty-eight
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Allied planes and became a menace over the desert. 159 Out of the actual 1,300 odd air
victories claimed by the Luftwaffe over the desert, fifteen pilots accounted for 674 kills,
with the top fifty-three pilots accounted for 1,042 of those victories. 160 The German aces
produced this imbalance of air to air kills because of their extensive experience and
frequency of air combat. The lop-sidedness of these victory figures was due, too, to the
nature of German air combat tactics. Their fighters flew in pairs of fours that allowed the
lead fighter to accumulate kills, while protected by his usually lesser experienced
wingman. The Luftwaffe was as a dangerous opponent and posed a serious threat to the
Desert Air Force. The Axis forces continued to attack also in the Mediterranean,
concentrating on Malta.
In the skies over North Africa, British pilots improved many different tactics
concerning aerial combat, including night fighting. The night operations in the second
battle of El Alamein, at the landing ground Burg-el-Arab on October 27, 1942, involved
Hawker Hurricanes. 161 The RAF’s goal was to hit the enemy at night behind his lines, to
prevent Axis planes from attacking the Eighth Army. The British Desert Air Force
utilized this technique with some success and learned the value of attacking grounded
enemy planes under the cover of night. This strategy generated a new mentality for pilots,
as targets now appeared impersonal; the speck on the ground belonging to a truck, boat,
and a grounded aircraft showed little signs of humanity compared to a dogfight where
one was faced with an opponent at roughly equal terms in a life and death the struggle.
Fortunately, these night raids encountered minimal air resistance.
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The versatile nature of the RAF Fighter Command allowed for a variety of tactics
that played to the strengths of their aircraft. One strong difference between British and
American pilots was that often the former alone possessed the necessary skills to perform
at night. The RAF pilots’ advanced training served them well, as they could fly and
navigate in the dark. The Americans did not capitalize on the potential advantages of
striking at night even later in the war, as American generals insisted on daylight bombing
raids. These often ended in disaster. RAF Bomber Command and parts of RAF Fighter
Command shared the ability to strike at night.
Unlike the British, the United States air forces experienced a peaceful home front
situation; no enemy posed a threat to America’s shores prior to the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. Without this challenge, American air combat
effectiveness failed to develop prior to TORCH. Without experiencing bombs falling on
American target areas, American air units neglected significant operations, including
development of fighter tactics to intercept bombers, construction of air defense networks,
and pilot-training with actual flight combat scenarios. Isolationism prevailed among
American society. These mistakes were evident at Pearl Harbor, where American
misunderstanding of preventive measures led to the elementary mistake of grouping
fighter aircraft together and openly on airfields, thereby creating ideal targets for the
attacking Japanese. General Walter Short commanding on Oahu thought such clustering a
wise choice, since he incorrectly concluded that sabotage was the serious threat. In
reality, his action made it possible for a few bombs to demolish his warplanes. Had
American forces experienced intense bombing, as had the British on Malta, they would
have known to spread out their aircraft to minimize the chance of destruction. My
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secondary sources agree that Britain’s previous air combat experience factored into its
successful performance in the desert and Mediterranean. The United States needed to
learn the lessons acquired by the British through air operations on Malta and over the
Western Desert.
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Chapter 10
Malta: Supreme Air Experience of Survival and Convoy Elimination.

The RAF developed tactics and strategies to defend Malta from invasion, as well
as attack enemy shipping convoys. Its defense of Malta and attacks on Axis convoys
impacted the war in the Western Desert. Hardships endured by service men on Malta
strengthened their resolve, as they survived relentless enemy bombing. RAF personal
stationed on Malta became battle-hardened, innovative, and experienced. 162
Malta’s naval port submarine base and strategically significant airfields were key
assets for Britain’s war effort. The Hal Far airfield, opened in 1929, located in the
southernmost part of the island, was designated Malta’s RAF station. Both this station
and, later, the airfield in the island’s center at Ta’Qali used grassy and stony fields.
Surfaces such as these made operations difficult under rainy conditions. 163
Malta was an important island to hold and had a long history including its great
siege of 1564 by the Turks. In 1814, the British acquired Malta through the Treaty of
Vienna. 164 Malta’s naval base opened roughly at the same time as the Suez Canal, in
1869. 165 Malta’s strategic and geographic position rendered it vital to British policy. The
Axis powers targeted Malta because of its advantageous location for both the Royal Air
Force and the Royal Navy. Malta’s natural harbors provided an excellent submarine base,
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and its airstrips allowed possible strikes against the Axis shipping bound for North
Africa. 166
For a prolonged period, Malta withstood constant bombardment by Axis bombers.
The arrival of the Luftwaffe in early 1941 added greatly to the effort began in 1940 by
Mussolini’s air force. Stuka dive bombers hit British shipping with lethal accuracy. 167
The Italians, with German support, continued their brutal attacks not only on Allied
shipping attempting to re-supply Malta, but on the island itself.
Under the pressure of bombardment, the British improvised methods for their
survival. Key headquarters were moved into caves, and efforts commenced to counter the
aerial attacks. The British dug their headquarters into the underground rock. Lord Gort,
Malta’s Governor-General, met with ACM Tedder, General Timberlake, and General
Brereton to discuss the state of the island’s defense. 168 The Royal Malta Force needed to
test the structural integrity of the aerodromes of the island’s air bases to prepare them to
withstand further bombardment. They ordered Gladiator Fighters to fire on select
buildings to determine if their defenses were adequate for protecting aircraft and fuel. If
the bullets got through, they redoubled their efforts to reinforce these structures. The
island’s defenders also imposed curfews to help protect base personnel from Axis planes
during night raids. 169 While the pilots often received credit for defending the island, the
largely unsung heroes were the ground crews who constantly fueled, armed, inspected,
and repaired the aircraft. 170 171
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Since the Axis implemented a tight blockade on Malta, food on the island became
scarce; Malta’s most serious problem was its shortage of food, as supply convoys had an
extremely tough time getting through the Axis lines. George F. Beurling, a Spitfire pilot
based on Malta, also wrote in his memoirs that he and fellow British airmen ate food they
dubbed “siege grub”: bully beef in many different creative variations supplemented with
Maltese cabbage. 172 Everyone ate “siege grub” regardless of rank, for at the time it was
the only nourishment available however, the sergeant pilots lived in relative comfort in
fairly large private homes. 173 Many of the Maltese hid in caves during bombardments.
Despite the problems from shortages of food, ammunition, spare parts, and fuel for the
aircraft, the RAF on Malta operated three hundred aircraft. Unless supply convoys
arrived, this would be impossible and Malta could be starved out.
As Malta eagerly awaited relief, it faced problems beyond the enemy bombers.
Fliegerkorps X, General Geisler’s anti-shipping unit, included JU 87, JU 88, and ME 110
aircraft. It attacked the island furiously throughout the month of January of 1941. 174
Stuka dive bombers created chaos for Maltese civilians. These planes banked to set up
their attacks, and then, without warning, plummeted towards the earth targeting houses
and civilians. As they executed their attacks, the metal screamers on the wheel pants
howled a deafening sound meant to strike fear in the hearts of its victims on the ground.
They also dove at a steep 70 degree dive for precision bombing. The bombs contained
metal scabbards from German bayonets to achieve a whistling effect, a practice used
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exclusively by the Luftwaffe. 175 The twin engine JU 88 delivered heavier bomb loads at
typically 30 degree dives with up to 2,000 kilograms of explosives. 176 After the Stukas
returned to Sicily on January 9, 1941, they left three Wellingtons damaged beyond repair
at Luqa. 177 These dive bombers made it difficult for the British to ship relief supplies to
the island. Their attacks continued throughout the year.
In March of 1942, the Luftwaffe began a yet more focused set of attacks.
Luftwaffe General Fieldmarschall Albert Kesselring and General der Flieger Paul
Deichmann implemented a plan of attack to disable and destroy the important military
targets, the airfields, port, and submarine base on Malta. Its first priority was to eliminate
the British fighters on the ground by means of surprise attacks at the air base located in
Ta Kali. The next objectives were the bomber and torpedo-planes based out of Luca, Hal
Far, and Calafrana. German aviators also sought to map out the effects bombing the
docks and harbors of the Valletta naval base. 178 On March 20, 1942, the Luftwaffe
conducted the first carpet bombing of the war in the Mediterranean, targeting Ta Kali.
This assault paled in comparison of scale to the immense carpet bombing that
followed. 179 German pilots were well-trained. The Italian pilots seemed more apathetic in
their philosophy. They functioned less efficiently as a team compared to the Germans. 180
Malta lacked effective defensive aircraft. German BF-109s outmatched Malta’s
Hurricanes and attacked relentlessly, in wave after wave. The island’s defenders needed
the Supermarine Spitfire to compete with the high performance BF-109s. The British
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command on Malta was so desperate to obtain Spitfires that it accepted a shipment of
fifteen in 1942 painted in the wrong camouflage scheme. While Malta needed aircraft
painted in a sea pattern with dark and light blues, it received instead planes dressed in
desert hues of brown and beige. 181 Nonetheless, many sources highlight the great relief of
the pilots who had been defending Malta with outmatched planes when the newly arrived
Spitfires alleviated their strain and substantially raised their morale level. However,
tactical use of the planes proved not to be a decisive factor in the overall protection of the
RAF’s Maltese air bases. 182 Courage, persistence and tenacity of the pilots and Maltese
people won the campaign; they survived against heavy odds.
Germany’s air units in the Mediterranean were dispersed over six general areas:
Tripolitania, Tunisia, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Aegean, which included Greece.
Their total force was eight hundred ninety Axis aircraft, two hundred eighty of which
were fighters. 183 The Luftwaffe stationed many of its planes in Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia,
around three hundred and ninety aircraft. That number included ten dive bombers, two
hundred seventy bombers, and eighty fighters. These planes were based within close
striking distance of Malta. 184 Tripolitania and Tunisia contained the second largest
grouping of Luftwaffe planes, with one hundred fifty and one hundred forty planes
respectively. 185 This deployment of German planes meant that Malta could anticipate
bombings of much greater magnitude. The Wehrmacht faced great difficulty in managing
the flow of its resources. While they put relentless pressure on the British at Malta, they
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were fighting on multiple fronts and found it difficult to supply and keep up their air
strength in the Mediterranean theater. 186 The Luftwaffe transferred many bombers from
the Mediterranean to the Eastern Front despite its need for them in operations against
Malta. Its core bomber fleet dwindled away as Berlin transferred two hundred eighty-five
aircraft to Russia within the short span of two months. 187 In the African desert, the Afrika
Korps under Rommel won victories; particularly in blunting British attacks but often
could not exploit these triumphs due to its lack of supplies.
The Italians and Germans targeted Malta with systematic and often around the
clock aerial bombardment. The location of Italian airfields only sixty miles off the coast
of Malta allowed easy access for Axis bombers to strike the island. 188 Malta’s defenses
did not include a radar-based intercept infrastructure. The island relied instead on visual
observers. Early in the air raids only four outdated Gladiator aircraft protected Malta.
These biplanes remained at full readiness on a twenty-four hour basis. However, the
official report on Malta revealed that only three of them survived the first engagement.
This left the entire defense of the island dependent on three archaic aircraft, named
respectively Faith, Hope, and Charity. 189 The bombardments took lives and destroyed
important infrastructure. Six Royal Malta artillerymen died during one Axis
bombardment of the island. 190 Further attacks produced numerous additional military
casualties. British troops stationed at Fort St. Elmo fired rounds desperately at incoming
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Italian bombers, until many met their deaths. 191 Axis bombs struck Valletta, the Maltese
capital, an average of eight times daily. In April of 1942, the Axis dropped over 6,728
tons of bombs on the island. 192 On April 7, 1942, Malta endured its 2000th raid in a
succession of attacks that appeared endless. 193 Malta‘s defenders received the George
Cross from King George VI for endurance and resilience during the bombardment on
April 15, 1942. 194 While the King formally recognized Malta for the anguish it withstood,
the attacks continued.
With German planes and support supplies sent to Russia, the Germans faced
great difficulty in sending sufficient support needed in the North African and
Mediterranean. The limited supplies sent were allocated to bolster the efforts of Rommel
and, for this reason, the Italian forces made up the greater part of the forces attacking
Malta. 195 The limitations on available aircraft and materials challenged Albert Kesselring
while serving as the commander and chief of the south Luftwaffe forces designated to
bomb Malta. Kesselring reported that losing planes on the Eastern Front negatively
impacted his operations in the Mediterranean. In a letter in early April, 1942, Kesselring
wrote that the Luftwaffe was highly successful in suppressing Malta. In the long run
however, due to the weakening of his available Mediterranean forces, he foresaw that his
decreased air strength would not keep Malta suppressed. 196 On May 21, Hitler postponed
indefinitely his scheduled invasion of the island. This also ended Malta’s aerial siege.
Hitler’s termination of ‘Operation Hercules’ can only be understood by considering the
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costliness of the earlier Operation Marita, the 1941 German airborne assault on Crete. On
May 20 of that year, Germany invaded Crete by landing its 7th Airborne Division on the
island by gliders and parachutes. These Luftwaffe troops suffered heavy casualties, yet
managed to take the island. During this operation, the Luftwaffe enjoyed the luxury of
complete air superiority. Five hundred transport aircraft and one hundred gliders, packed
with German airborne troops, descended on Crete. The few and widely spaced Greek air
fields clogged up with the heavy German traffic of one hundred eighty fighters, two
hundred eighty bombers, one hundred fifty dive bombers, and forty reconnaissance
aircraft. 197 German parachutists filled the sky; 22,750 elite German troops landed on
Crete. Although they succeeded, the Germans suffered heavy casualties. The 7th Airborne
experienced more losses in the Crete operation than the Wehrmacht did in its earlier
mainland invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia combined. 198 During the initial hours of
combat on Crete, the German units suffered fifty percent casualties. Operation Marita
cost Germany around 11,375 men. 199
Marita’s shockingly high casualty rate appalled Hitler; he chose not to use
airborne units for his future invasions. He also prioritized his resources. Hitler considered
Russia a far more important goal than Malta or Egypt. He refused to commit large forces
against Malta at this time and insisted on transferring units to the Eastern Front. He
assumed the Italians could suppress the island, and planned to deploy German forces
there in late July. If the Germans had used paratroops, an airborne assault on Malta would
most likely have succeeded. The British defenders stationed on Malta could not defeat the
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elite German paratroops since they lacked the quantity of small arms sufficient for
defense. While Axis commanders believed that their efforts were reducing Malta to
submission, the British survived there and continued to strike Axis convoys. 200 Many of
the supplies sent to North Africa never arrived because of British attacks by aircraft based
on Malta.
The aircrews stationed on Malta remained in a constant state of war, through
missions against convoys or defending the island from continuous attack and
bombardment. The non-commissioned officers enforced heightened air base security by
conducting patrols of the instillation armed with loaded revolvers. 201 Their patrols kept
order to the fragile situation of limited supplies and constant bombardment. These
hardships increased the resolve of the pilots to protect the island. Personnel were
successful in reconstructing damaged hangers and moving aircraft over a shelled tarmac.
The constant bombings remained so fierce that returning aircraft stationed in Malta often
had to deal with combat over their airfields. One episode involved of a group of
Swordfish returning to Malta, after its night convoy raid, while the base was under attack
by the Luftwaffe. Due to the timely presence of Hurricanes, the BF-109s were driven off,
and heavy losses among the obsolete Swordfish bombers were avoided. The available
records indicate that the majority of the planes survived, however they did not specify the
number of losses. The planes that landed safely folded their wings to minimize target
surface area exposed to overhead attack. Despite these precautions, a follow up attack by
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JU-88s destroyed two of the Swordfish parked on the ground. This illustrates the real risk
involved in basing planes at an airfield under constant pressure of attack. 202
BF-109 pilots classified the slow moving Swordfish formation as easy targets.
The group of Swordfish flew between “friendly” ground fire and the firepower of the BF109s. 203 Malta desperately needed additional fighter planes to protect its torpedo
bombers. Improvising with outdated aircraft and equipment proved effective; despite
being outnumbered, the few fighters allotted to protect the torpedo planes kept the enemy
fighters away from the bombers. Only later when more advanced planes, such as
Spitfires, arrived, did the RAF on Malta conduct its air operations relatively unhindered.
The British relied heavily on American shipping to move its fighters and supplies
to Gibraltar and into the Mediterranean and North African theaters of operation.
Mechanics found that engine spare parts for the new types of fighters were in short
supply. The improved Hurricane II fighters slowly replaced older models, although they
paled in comparison to the Spitfire, a truly exceptional fighter against its German
opponents. The British had great difficulty shipping Spitfires to North Africa due to its
elongated wings, appendages too long to fit on the elevators of most conventional aircraft
carriers. In June, Britain’s Middle East Air Force included five hundred and fifty-nine
planes divided into thirty-four squadrons. Four hundred and nineteen of these were
newer, up-to-date models. As shipments arrived on carriers, they replaced obsolete
aircraft and increased the number of available British planes. 204 The British had seven
hundred and eighty newer planes out of total eight hundred forty-six aircraft in the
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adjacent theaters by mid-October. Organizationally, its air arm expanded to fifty-two
operational squadrons. 205 Although the arrival of Spitfires was welcomed, they provided
little relief at first, as the Germans destroyed the first shipment within seventy-two hours
of its arrival. Due to the vulnerability of the planes on Malta’s cratered airfields and the
difficulties and inabilities of the ground crews to repair bombed planes, German bombers
destroyed or rendered the Spitfires useless. 206 Improved defenses were required for the
survival of the next Spitfires shipped to the island. After this was accomplished, Spitfires
played a dual role, attacking Axis convoys and defending Malta from Axis air attacks.
Shipments between Gibraltar and Alexandria included cargos of food, petrol,
ammunition, parts, aircraft, and oil. Their voyage followed a route of eight hundred miles
across the Mediterranean, but Malta was only a few minutes flight time from Axis
airfields. 207 This perilous journey was necessary to deliver vital supplies to Malta.
Shipping planes by sea was also very risky. Producing and delivering aircraft was costly,
yet the RAF needed desperately to import newer model planes for use in Malta and the
Desert Air Force. In August 1942, a convoy of fourteen ships involved in the largest such
relief operation, code named Operation Pedestal, sailed for the island. Pedestal intended
to provide Malta with the oil and other supplies desperately needed for its survival. 208
Among these vessels, the oil tanker remained the most crucial, due to the island’s dire
fuel situation. The aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, loaded with new model aircraft to relieve
the losses endured on Malta, escorted the convoy. The British originally built Eagle to
serve as a seaplane platform in 1919, one of the earliest full deck carriers in the British
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fleet. 209 It lacked the modernity and the space of newer American carriers. Eagle came
under attack by U-boat and Axis dive bombers early in its voyage. The enemy targeted
the carrier because its cargo provided the island’s best defense. On August 11, 1942, the
Luftwaffe struck the slow moving convoy and sank nine ships, including the Eagle. 210
Only five ships in the convoy reached the island, and all of them had sustained heavy
damage. 211 Yet again a relief convoy intended for Malta met with disaster. Fortuitously,
the oil tanker survived the onslaught and provided Malta with fuel necessary to continue
air operations. This supply of fuel extended the island’s life expectancy by ten weeks. 212
Tedder worried that severe losses among convoys sailing to resupply Malta would
disastrously impact the fighting spirit and effectiveness of personnel garrisoned there. He
replaced General Dobbie as the British commander on Malta with General Gort. 213 While
Tedder hoped to reestablish morale among the men, problems remained. Acts of
insubordination and disregard for the chain of command continued during General Gort’s
watch. Reports of decreased morale on Malta convinced Tedder that a defensive, defeatist
atmosphere dominated the garrison on Malta. 214 Gort tried very hard to keep his defenses
alert, a difficult task, as the pilots and antiaircraft gunners operated under extremely
stressful conditions.
Historians disagree whether the arrival of the Spitfires on Malta made a large
difference to its defense. The London Times claimed that they did, emphasizing the
numbers of downed aircraft attributed to the Spitfires and other aircraft based on Malta.
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This assessment relied on results from the time period after the ill-fated shipment from
the Wasp. Flying from Malta, the RAF lost thirty-four aircraft but managed to shoot
down two hundred and four Axis aircraft in the renewed attacks that began in early
October of 1942. 215 On October 11 alone, Maltese-based Spitfires destroyed eight of the
fifty-eight attacking Luftwaffe bombers along with seven Axis fighters. In this raid Malta
suffered a death toll of eighty, as well as total destruction of four hundred and sixty-nine
buildings. 216 With much of its civil and military infrastructure pulverized, it was unclear
how long Malta could survive. On October 13, 1942, the London Times reported eight
kills by the defending aircraft, contributing to a total of fifty-six enemy aircraft destroyed
in the month of October. 217 These numbers reflected the tenacity of the British pilots who
held out against the onslaught of enemy air attacks. The Times carefully crafted its
coverage to deemphasize, or at times omit, news of British military failures and losses,
for they deemed them too negative for public knowledge.
Malta continued to endure intense bombardment from Axis aircraft late into 1942,
during the Allies’ preparation for Operation TORCH. On October 15, 1942, the London
Times claimed that the success of Malta-based planes in disrupting Axis shipping
convoys were a probable cause of its continued bombardment by the Axis. 218 The Times
also disclosed that the official German report boasted the destruction of fifteen Allied
aircraft and effectively damaged British aerodromes. However, it implied that Malta was
inadequately defended. 219
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While such news coverage failed to reveal to the British public the severity of the
Maltese ordeal, the garrisons on the island endured. As Malta survived, RAF pilots
gained skills necessary to conduct attacks on Axis convoys. While RAF pilots improved
their flight skills, the RAF soon had to cope with underpowered American planes, which
arrived to replenish its strength. Later, inexperienced American pilots were sent into
battle. These pilots were ill-equipped to face a well trained experienced enemy.
As Malta remained an important area of operation, the war in North Africa raged
on. In late October and early November of 1942, the lengthy Second Battle of El Alamein
occurred on the African mainland as Malta suffered heavy attacks by the Luftwaffe.
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These renewed attacks continued later in November, as the joint invasion of Morocco and
Algeria by Britain and the United States was approaching. After the November 7 and 8
TORCH landings, Malta was used as an Allied reconnaissance platform for determining
Axis positions in Tunisia.
With such intense air combat over Malta, it is a wonder why American pilots
were not sent sooner to assist in the defense of the island. This action could have
provided valuable combat experience to the American pilots, while at the same time,
affording relief for overworked RAF pilots. This deployment was not considered by the
Allies as America focused on the task of training and preparing its forces.
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Chapter 11
American Aid: Help or Hindrance?

The Malta-based RAF pilots’ constant exposure to combat set them apart from the
green American aviators. Both the Mediterranean and North African desert were harsh
and unforgiving to airmen. The RAF pilots on Malta worked with outdated, underequipped aircraft at air stations subjected to frequent bombardment. RAF pilots based in
the desert coped with unrelenting flies, heat, and sand. Classroom instruction could not
effectively teach coping methods for operations in these conditions. Through their flight
experience and exposure to these adverse conditions, RAF pilots became battle-hardened.
The British airmen tended to perceive their green American counterparts as overeager for
action and oblivious to the harsh conditions of the war. 221 America’s neutrality had
sheltered American pilots from the wartime realities faced by the RAF. While America
remained neutral, the RAF’s participation in the 1940 battles of France and Britain
exposed it to modern air warfare. Afterwards, RAF pilots were, predominately, seasoned
veterans had developed valuable skills and tactics through combat, experience which set
them well above the level of preparedness of their American counterparts. Not only did
the Americans, at this time, lack the fighting experience and skills that the RAF acquired
through combating the Axis, their level of training was not equal to the training of new
British pilots, from instructors who were survivors of the 1940 and 1941 air battles.
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The British believed that American pilots needed to learn how to conduct their air
operation as modern warfare from the RAF, since America’s isolationism engendered a
state of military un-preparedness. The few American pilots fortunate enough to have been
shipped to Britain before TORCH received such training. This gave them an advantage,
but they still lacked the skills to even attain a survivable level of readiness. The Royal Air
Force training program required an intense and rigorous training regiment, including
several months of flight time in actual combat aircraft. American pilots flew either
Hurricanes or Spitfires for the short time they trained with the RAF. 222 It would take a
complex, costly campaign, to elevate America’s green pilots to the level of those flying in
the RAF.
Many analysts from both Axis and Allied countries thought the entrance of the
United States would bring great change to the war, since America possessed immense
quantities of personnel and resources. 223 The United States’ failure to advance its military
technology in order keep up with the high standards of the rest of the world, especially in
the areas of tanks and fighter aircraft, was one of its more prevalent war-related
problems. Furthermore, American fighter units lacked the training and experience needed
to fight a modern air war. The machines, tactics, and strategies of air combat had
developed significantly since America’s involvement in the First World War. Without
engaging the Luftwaffe in combat, American pilot trainees learned theory and practiced
maneuvers without the assistance of air war veterans.
The British knew that the American Air Force’s inexperience left its pilots unable
to defeat the Luftwaffe. Churchill’s chief military representative in Washington, Sir John
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Dill, informed London that American military forces “are more unready for war than it is
possible to imagine.” 224 Untested, obsolete planes and equipment plagued America in its
effort to function on an equal level with its ally. The battered British war machine
benefited from years of fighting, its performance improved through combat. The aircraft
delivered from America to Britain though the Lend Lease Agreement needed to be
modified for desert use. Even then, these American fighter planes could not compete with
those of the Luftwaffe’s fighters. 225 Despite those problems, Great Britain desired the
United States as an ally, for they needed its manpower and war materials. The British
realized they could not alone defeat Germany and Italy, so they sought American
involvement.
The unique environment in the North Africa theater presented several challenges.
The physical environment seriously impacted military operations. Wide expanses of flat
desert, with few landmarks, made navigation difficult. Pilots needed to use their maps
and navigation methods successfully in order to fly to the correct coordinates on specific
missions. The desert’s heat depleted the strength of pilots, both in and out of their
cockpits. Most American military training aimed for deployment in moderate climates
ideal for aviation. Without experience in desert survival, fighting there demanded major
adjustments for American pilots and troops alike.
The harsh environment of the North African theater posed challenges to the
airplanes as well. Aircraft modifications were necessary to operate in the desert. Under
the Lend Lease Agreement, the RAF received numerous American-made aircraft shipped
for use in North Africa. This program supplied the British Desert Air Force with
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American fighters, such as the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk. The British modified the P-40s
further for desert combat, based on what they learned during combat against the
Luftwaffe during the Cyrenaica campaign. 226 The poorly constructed P-40 proved illsuited to the desert environment. The American-manufactured planes frequently crashed;
accidents due to mechanical errors occurred. 227 The British faced another problem when
they found that the American planes arrived without spare parts or mechanics. This
created difficulties for repairing the aircraft. American and British parts were
incompatible. Also, the planes were difficult to deliver.
Limitation of the aircraft’s flight range made the delivery by air problematic. The
distance required the planes to be shipped, rather than flown, to Egypt. When the planes
arrived at their destination, the British found them untested and improperly prepared for
war. The American manufacturers failed to provide specifications needed for their planes
to compete against Axis aircraft. One reason for this is American aircraft manufactures
did not consider any input from their British counterparts during the testing of the planes.
Britain’s aviation manufacturers took what they learned from combat and modified their
aircraft to improve their performance. The RAF regarded American planes which did not
live up to its standards as a hindrance.
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Chapter 12
The Air War in the Desert

As more American planes arrived in North Africa, the Luftwaffe maintained its
advantage over the Allies. Its air bases, situated in Italy, were much closer to Libya.
Allied shipping routes for delivering new aircraft to this front were long and treacherous.
Ships either threaded the needle, the narrow Strait of Gibraltar that separates Europe from
Africa, or journeyed around the Cape of Good Hope, almost circumnavigating the
continent of Africa before entering the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. 228 This led
to long lapses between shipments. Consequently, shortages were a daily reality to
Britain’s desert air units.
When their surface transports faced destruction in the Mediterranean, the British
used submarines to transport supplies. These could deliver only small loads of fuel and
ammunition. The pilots found it necessary to conserve these items, and this decreased
their combat effectiveness. 229 Otherwise, the Desert Air Force was cut off from receiving
equipment. Since many convoys failed to arrive, the British enlisted local seafarers to
transport supplies. 230 Although this makeshift solution provided a limited flow of
supplies, it was not an adequate substitute, for their loads, too, were limited. Limited
provisions meant improvised air bases. Under-supplied airbases in the North Africa
provided little in the way of comfort for their personnel. Airmen stationed on Malta
enjoyed very few amenities due also to constant Axis air strikes.
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RAF bases on the North African mainland featured harsh living conditions,
including fly-infested tents baked by the desert sun. Pilots endured such hardships
beyond fighting in the sky. Visual images of air bases in North Africa, from original
archival photographs, show British and American outposts appearing underdeveloped in
comparison to the more permanent Axis bases; the latter boasted paved runways and
hangers. The former lacked concrete taxiways or parking spaces. Orderly rows of planes
parked on the flat desert ground stand in the background, as pilots line up in formation
for roll call. The aircraft were located some distance away from ground equipment and
large fuel drums. This spacing was necessary, as it prevented the danger of losing the
planes if the fuel ignited when hit. 231 Tents dotting the sandy wasteland served as
command headquarters, planning centers, and sleeping quarters. These meager conditions
were among the hardships awaiting the Americans in the desert.
Due to the sand, heat, and storms, operations carried out over the desert were
difficult. These conditions put great strains on the aircraft and the men assigned to
maintain them. Sand entered the engines through air intakes. It transformed lubricating
oil into a harmful paste, which caused nightmares for maintenance personnel. 232 British
base personnel grew resourceful. Mechanics employed alternative measures to adapt
aircraft to the harsh desert environment. They used specially designed filters to solve the
sand menace. These filters added drag, decreasing the overall performance of the
aircraft. 233 Personnel found water and food in short supply in the desert. Water was
especially valuable. It filled vehicle radiators to prevent overheating; this took priority
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over its use for bathing. 234 Flies infested the environment everywhere and proved a
constant irritant to the men. The desert was extremely hot in the day and grew cold at
night. The metal planes became incredibly hot from the scorching sun, another desert
condition which made maintenance and handling difficult. The British air bases on Malta
were faced with much greater severe supply shortages than those in the North African
desert. Dire conditions prevailed, even during special events such as visits from generals
and base inspections.
Malta, while not plagued by the sands of mainland North Africa, experienced
supply shortages and inadequate base conditions. On November 14, 1942, American
Lieutenant-General Lewis Hyde Brereton presented the first ace of the 57th group,
Lieutenant Layman L. Middleditch, with the Distinguished Service Cross at a base on
Malta. 235 The general wrote in his diary about the unusual appearance of the makeshift
uniforms worn by the men during a formal ceremony, testifying to the difficulty of
shipping supplies to the fighting front. Cooks used flour sacks as substitutes for aprons.
Mechanics went shirtless due to the shortage of coveralls. Chuckling, the general also
pointed out that toilet paper was such a scarce commodity that pilots often stuffed rolls in
their flight suit pockets. 236 The aviators and ground crews of the RAF learned to cope
with these extremes and, enduring these hardships, grew tougher and more resourceful.
These conditions grew even more unbearable when Allied soldiers discovered that
American equipment was ineffective. Through the Lend Lease agreement, and later,
during American deployment in TORCH, the British rushed untested American weapons
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and equipment to the battlefront with disastrous results. Beyond flawed airplanes,
American sent tanks to the British, including M4 Shermans. This vehicle often proved to
be a death trap up against German Tiger tanks and the 88 flack gun that Rommel used to
great effect as an antitank weapon. The medium tank Sherman was, nonetheless, a
significant improvement over other American tanks supplied to the British, Grant and
Lee armored fighting vehicles. However, the Sherman’s medium armor was highly
vulnerable. 237 The American War Department rushed this tank into production, with its
74-mm main gun mounted on a rotating turret. 238 According to historian Rick Atkinson,
the Sherman’s shell failed to puncture the armor of the German Tiger tank even at point
blank range, while the Tiger’s larger round could easily ignite the Sherman tank’s
ammunition stores from a range of over a mile. 239 In February 1943, Rommel’s panzers
devastated American armor at Kasserine Pass. 240 In just two weeks at the front in Tunisia,
American units lost a total of one hundred twenty-four tanks. 241 This pattern held true as
well for some of the American aircraft used in the North African campaign. The British
knew that their desert models of the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire
matched or outclassed most German planes, and the RAF pilots preferred these over
American aircraft. After learning of their ineffectiveness the RAF noted concerns about
receiving American manufactured planes. British commanders understood that
inexperienced American pilots flying technically inferior aircraft invited disaster. Britain
nonetheless welcomed their assistance. When America entered the war in December
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1941, the British eagerly anticipated fuller assistance. Although America sent obsolete
aircraft and novice pilots, war-weary British forces needed such manpower and additional
resources.
London faced a difficult dilemma in deciding how to best utilize the incoming
American air units. The British feared that America deployed its air elements abroad
regardless of their state of readiness. Most American units allocated for deployment
lacked a requisite level of training and preparation. In order to compensate for American
deficiencies, the British planned for American bombing units to attack ports thought to
offer minimal resistance. Vichy French forces defended these ports. Meanwhile, the
Allied command tasked the RAF units to confront battle-hardened German forces
deployed in the east. The RAF, having proven itself in Malta and North Africa, was
capable of carrying out such missions with lower losses then the untested American air
units. While the British held strongly to their belief that American pilots received poor
training and were, in late 1942, ill-suited for combat, the RAF needed assistance to mount
efforts against the Axis in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean. Washington did
not agree with the British that the Allies should focus their efforts on North Africa.
Roosevelt and his military leaders, General George Marshall and Admiral Ernest King
preferred an early assault on Nazi-occupied France. This hampered the planning process,
as Churchill and his commanders sought to convince the Americans that this was
premature in 1942.
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Chapter 13
Operation TORCH

Winston Churchill met with President Franklin Roosevelt in Washington, D.C., at
the ARCADIA Conference in late December of 1941 to discuss Allied war strategy.
Churchill explained the advantages of waging a North African campaign to the other
leaders. 242 The American military leaders, hesitant to commit forces to North Africa,
viewed the area as having far less strategic importance than Europe. Africa seemed to
them an illogical military objective; the Americans labeled it a side show. While
American leaders wanted to liberate Europe quickly by first directly assaulting Hitler’s
Atlantic defenses on the French coast, Churchill aimed to protect Britain’s imperial
interests in Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta. He argued that the best way to get into Europe
was through the “soft underbelly” of Italy. His primary defensive goal was to prevent
Hitler from obtaining Middle East oil. The British firmly believed that the Allies should
not yet assault the West European mainland due to the Luftwaffe’s control of the
European skies. Also, the British regarded Hitler’s coastal defenses as too strong to
overcome, and believed that the Western Allies lacked the experience, strength and
equipment to undertake a successful invasion along the French Atlantic coast. 243
Churchill believed that operations in North Africa could serve as a suitable
opportunity for American troops to gain combat experience. This rationale extended to
pilots, because North Africa, unlike the European mainland, with its relative absence of
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anti-aircraft units, seemed a more suitable field of operation for newly trained pilots. In
addition, waging a North African campaign from both west and east provided the
possibility of cornering the Afrika Korps in Tunisia, once Anglo-American troops landed
on the Maghreb’s opposite side in Morocco. This projected operation developed into
Operation TORCH, a sizable Anglo-American invasion of northwest Africa scheduled to
begin on November 8, 1942. Admiral Andrew Cunningham knew that the under-trained
American units lacked the preparation necessary to be successful in the onset of the full
scale operation that faced them. Nonetheless, he believed in the importance of acting
without delay, in spite of their deficiencies. He stressed the importance of swift action for
the success of the operation as a whole. Action had to be taken quickly in order to trap
the Germans and Italians. Samuel Elliot Morison cited Admiral Cunningham’s written
response to his direct feeling and position on this matter: 244
No officer commanding a unit will ever be satisfied that he has had adequate
preparation and training until his unit is trained and equipped down to the last
gaiter button. There are times in history when we can not afford to wait for the
final polish. I suggest that it should be made widely known to all units that for
“TORCH” particularly we could not afford to wait, and that the risk of embarking
on these large-scale operations with inadequate training was deliberately
accepted, in order to strike while the time was ripe. We must now push forward
our training so that such a situation can not again arise. 245
Andrew Cunningham made an important point: the state of improperly trained and
unprepared American units demanded British assistance. Throughout the fighting,
Admiral Cunningham assumed that the American air forces would improve through
combat. He deemed such war experience as the most effective way for unprepared
American forces to learn how to fight. The operations could not be postponed past
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November, for winter conditions on the beachheads would then prohibit them. Suitable
weather would not resume until the following year. 246 This meant that the Allies had to
launch the operation in November regardless of how inexperienced and unprepared the
Americans were for combat.
Preceding the TORCH landings in French Morocco, Oran, and Algiers, the Allied
command agreed to assign the United States Army’s Twelfth Air Force and groups of
American carrier-based naval aircraft to provide cover over the invasion beaches and
assist the seizure of airfields. This was the initial phase of a highly complex operation
involving the Anglo-American allies. 247 When planning TORCH, American generals
decided which American air units to assign to cover specific landing areas. General
James Doolittle took aerial command of the Casablanca area. He requested air support
from the 33rd Fighter Group, a unit of P-40s thought to be sufficient to achieve local air
superiority when combined with naval fighters. 248 While General Doolittle projected
confidence in America’s untested airmen, he planned for the unexpected by employing
significantly more pilots than required by the operation. This overcompensation gave his
green pilots a numerical advantage over their opponents.
In preparation for Operation TORCH, the Allies positioned their land aircraft and
aircraft carriers in designated areas. By September of 1942, the Twelfth Air Force,
commanded by Doolittle, assumed control of two newly arrived American P-38
groups. 249 These planes flew from Britain nonstop to Gibraltar following a meandering
route around Iberia, due to the political complexities of Spain’s neutrality. This lengthy,
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twelve hundred mile journey to the operations deployment area demonstrated the sheer,
long-range capabilities of this exceptional fighter. 250 In order to make this arduous trip,
each aircraft carried two 165 gallon fuel tanks to extend its range. According to the
maintenance and operation manual, installing the tanks was a fairly simple and straight
forward procedure. Each tank attached directly to the plane’s underbelly. 251 Other
American fighters, the P-39s and P-40s, required the use of drop tanks to make the long
trip. Following the arrival of the P-38 Lightnings, one hundred twenty-five Bell P-39 Air
Cobras flew to Gibraltar. Later, P-40s flew to the same deployment area to assist in
attacks on the ports targeted during Operation TORCH. 252 American air commanders
rushed planes overseas to England and other staging areas for use in Operation Torch and
subsequent action during the North African campaign. The biggest question was how
American aircraft would measure up in combat against the Luftwaffe. With green pilots,
the full potential of the aircraft would remain unknown until engaged in actual battles.
Due to problems they faced using American aircraft through the Lend Lease, the
RAF already depreciated American hardware. Lend Lease planes gained a bad reputation
with British mechanics. Foreign mechanical construction and layout of instrumentation of
the American aircraft confused British pilots and lessened their performance when flown
by RAF pilots.
American units involved in Operation TORCH faced, initially, not Germans or
Italians, but Vichy French opponents. This unlikely circumstance derived from both the
soured relations between the French and British at this time and the control of the Vichy
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regime over French military units in North Africa. The latter sympathized and/or
collaborated with the Nazis. In a series of miscommunication and distrust, a violent
incident destroyed the earlier fragile partnership between England and France. In
“Operation Catapult,” an attempt to prevent the French fleet from falling into German
hands, a British fleet on June 20, 1940, opened fire on French naval units stationed at
Mers-el-Kebir on the Algerian coast. This unfortunate clash resulted in the destruction of
this French fleet. 253 Most seriously, the operation resulted in 1,297 dead and 354
wounded French sailors. 254 This event so poisoned French-British relations that it
compelled the Allies to send American units to invade French-controlled regions of North
Africa. Mers-el-Kebir discouraged the British from undertaking further action against the
French, providing an opportunity for green American forces to face an opponent less
proficient and determined than the Afrika Korps. The Allies assigned these areas to
American air units; they were the obvious choice to face the anti-British Vichy French,
who as yet held no grudge against the Americans.
At first, the green American air units without the aid of the RAF experienced
great difficulty facing the French pilots. The American air units’ level of training caused
frequent preventable accidents during the initial phase of the TORCH air operations.
These air operations succeeded only because of superior Allied numbers in aircraft over
those of the French defenders. The TORCH air operations plan issued on September 20,
1942, required the American Twelfth Air Force to attack the widely separated Vichy-held
ports of Casablanca and Oran in preparation for the invasion. Dividing the air support
weakened the operation. Military historian Wesley Craven argued that the Allied decision
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to split the air commands into two groups, each with its commander and operating in
different target areas, segregated and diluted their strength and impact. 255 The divided air
command encountered trouble in coordinating air operations. Furthermore, the unified
naval command could not successfully communicate to both air commands.
Air Marshal Sir William Welsh and General Doolittle headed the separate Allied
air commands. Welsh took charge of the Eastern Air Command (E.A.C.), which included
RAF air units commissioned to assist in the attack on Algiers and Tunis. The British
E.A.C. provided air support for the operation to seize Algiers and move towards Tunis,
involving the capture of the harbors of Bougie, Philippeville, and Bone. 256 The Western
Air Command, consisting of the American Twelfth Air Force and naval air units,
concentrated on supporting of the landings at Oran and Casablanca. General Doolittle
brought his Twelfth Air Force into the Western Air Command. It was three times larger
than the E.A.C.: the Twelfth Air Force consisted of 1,244 aircraft, while the E.A.C.
contained only 454 planes. 257 The planners realized it would be more effective to use the
navy’s carrier aircraft to provide initial support for the landings rather than relying on
naval bombardment alone. The American naval aircraft would be the initial air assets
committed until secured coastal aerodromes permitted for the Twelfth Air Force and the
E.A.C. to take over. 258 The tasks assigned to the naval planes included clearing the skies
of enemy fighters and strafing enemy airfields to expedite advances by the ground forces.
Use of the carriers created a distinct advantage for the Allies. Aircraft returned to the
carriers when they finished their mission, unlike land-based planes. The French-
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controlled landing areas needed to be secured by ground units before land-based fighters
could operate in North Africa.
As attack plans developed, American logistical mishaps threatened to undermine
the success of the operation. Shortages of aviation fuel, ammunition, oil, and spare parts
kept planes operating. American commanders, unfamiliar with the logistics of managing
air units, committed grave mistakes by allocating resources disproportionate to the forces
attached to Operation TORCH. Command expected the American Twelfth Air Force to
receive supplies from the Eighth Air Force Service Command. Failure at this made
creation of its own service command necessary. This seriously depleted the Eighth Air
Force’s resources, leaving it undersupplied for the operation. 259 The Eighth Air Force
reported that it lost at least seventy-five percent of its supplies to the Twelfth Air
Force. 260 The British developed a more efficient method of allocating resources to each
unit with its own built-in control, preventing resources from being taken away from their
respected units without direct orders from command. 261
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Chapter 14
American Baptism by Fire

The Twelfth Air Force played a restricted role in the TORCH landings. Its air
units involved the initial heaviest fighting included the 97th and 301st Groups. These
consisted of American bombers escorted by P-38 Lightnings of the 1st and 4th Fighter
Groups, and Spitfires of the British 31st and 52nd Groups. 262 Navy Wildcats engaged in
the majority of the air combat. The Navy assigned its Wildcats to provide air cover for
the American landings and to neutralize enemy airfields in anticipation of the arrival of
American ground troops. Once secured, these airfields would host the planes of the
Twelfth Air Force.
The Wildcats attacked the coasts over Casablanca on the morning of November 8,
1942. 263 To the east the British feared that the Germans would commandeer the French
warships based in Algeria. At Oran, French forces counterattacked with fifty-five
Dewointine 520s launched from La Senia. 264 The French D.520 flew at a maximum
speed of 332 mph (534 km/hr), slightly faster than the American F4F Wildcat’s top speed
of 318 mph. 265 The air station at Port Lyautey, Morocco, held twenty-five Dewoitine
520’s and eleven Martin 167 French bombers. Twenty-three French fighters stationed at
Casablanca threatened the American landing forces. 266

262

Craven, 59.
John W. Lambert. Wildcats Over Casablanca November 1942 Operation Torch (St Paul: Phalanx,
1992), 5.
264
John Keegan. The Times Atlas of the Second World War (New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1989),
112.
265
Charles Catton. The World War II Warplanes Guide (New Jersey: Hartwell Books, 2001),108
266
Tillman, 171.
263

110
The RAF commanders regarded the French air force as a lesser threat than the
Italians and assumed the green American pilots would be able to defeat it. American
pilots struggled when fighting the French in their initial baptism of fire. The Wildcats
arrived and met Vichy resistance. The Vichy French air strength in Morocco totaled
around two hundred aircraft, distributed among seven airfields. American sources, pilot
diaries, and after action repots, described the resultant air battles. One pilot, Ed Seiler,
flew a Wildcat protecting the Allied landings. 267 During his first combat sortie, he
engaged multiple French fighters over Casablanca. His flight of Wildcats managed to
silence gun batteries shelling the landing forces. While doing so, they came under attack
by five French fighters. The Wildcats could outmaneuver, but not outrun, Dewoitine 520
fighters. 268 The American planes’ payload of heavy bombs impeded their performance by
slowing them down; their ordinances also rendered them less maneuverable. 269
Nevertheless, on this mission, the Americans managed to shoot down two French planes.
As the battle raged in the sky over the beaches, French bombers flew out to sea to
threaten the American armada. Wildcats flying combat air patrol noticed the danger and
destroyed the bombers before they could threaten the US carriers, destroyers, support
ships, and transports. 270 The American naval fighters, early in the operation, also
eliminated a number of French aircraft and cleared the enemy airfields from threats to the
Allied forces.
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Attacking the French Moroccan airfields proved to be more difficult than
anticipated. During their attack on Cazes airdrome in Casablanca on November 8,
American Navy Wildcats encountered tough aerial resistance from Vichy aircraft,
including D.520s and imported P-36s. 271 The Dewoitine 520s, grouped in formation to
challenge the Allied aircraft. The American planes destroyed other French planes, those
caught on the ground, in strafing attacks. 272 Out of 1420 rounds of ammunition loaded
onto each of the Wildcats before battle, the trigger sensitive green American pilots fired
an average of 904 rounds, yet scored few hits on their targets. 273 One of the French planes
shot down Lieutenant Charles A. Shields; he opened his canopy and bailed out. As he
parachuted from his Wildcat, French ground forces fired on him. He replied with his
pistol. 274 The Americans also suffered casualties from friendly fire, undeveloped
navigational skills, and unfamiliarity with aircraft handling and maneuvers.
Widespread instances of catastrophic navigational error occurred during TORCH.
Lieutenant Ernest, Wood Jr., flew his Wildcat over the coastline and engaged the French
under of the cover of his wingman, Ensign Andrew B. Conner, Jr. The pair tackled a
large force of Dewoitine 520s and utilized evasive maneuvers they had learned in
training. They managed to shoot down one French plane, but Ensign Conner got lost due
to his lack of navigational skills. He ran out of fuel searching for his aircraft carrier.
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Ensign Braun also could not navigate back to the ship and just as Ensign Conner did,
ditched his Wildcat in the Atlantic. 275
Another example of American mishaps occurred when Squadron Air Group 29
lost an entire flight of four planes from both mechanical failure and navigational
miscalculations. More experienced American pilots suffered mechanical failures due to
mistakes made by haphazard ground crew preparation and a lack on their part of
preventative and reactive malfunction remedy procedures. Lieutenant George Trumpter
broke away from combat due to failing oil pressure and disappeared. The Squadron
leader, Lieutenant Commander John T. Black, experienced trouble during takeoff with
broken landing gear, yet flew his mission. When he attained a critical fuel level he turned
back, abandoning the rest of his flight. Lack of fuel and broken undercarriages forced the
rookie ensigns who filled Black’s formation to ditch in the Atlantic. 276 This cost the
carrier four undamaged aircraft. The four remaining green pilots failed to locate their
carrier, USS Santee, due to their limited navigational skills. Without their flight leaders,
their situation was hopeless. Their rushed training ignored or overlooked rudimentary
skills involving navigating back to their carrier. Many had to ditch. Lt. Hammond
Cassidy, Andres Bold and Ensign Ball experienced problems and landed at the USS
Suwannee because they lacked sufficient fuel to fly to their assigned carrier. This
example of poor fuel management is one of many indicators of deficient American
training. 277 Improper training, inexperience, and faulty equipment led to the widespread
accidents and problems among American air units during Operation TORCH.
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The pilots encountered difficulties apart from navigation. Lt. Hammond Cassidy,
Andres Bold and Ensign Ball mismanaged their fuel consumption and landed at the USS
Suwannee instead of flying the additional distance to their assigned carrier. This further
example of failed fuel management is one of the indicators of the grave effects of the
incomplete American training program on rookie American airmen during TORCH. 278
Two planes crashed during takeoff on the USS Santee. Even more precarious than
takeoffs, carrier landings presented pilots with their biggest challenge. One F4F
attempting to land approached at a dangerous angle and crashed into the deck. The
impact ripped apart the plane’s tail section. The pilot had very little experience landing
on carrier decks during his training. Such mishaps, caused by American airmen’s
misjudgment and undeveloped skills, reduced the Santee to nine remaining working
aircraft from its initial complement of thirty. 279
These American pilots who engaged the French developed specific perceptions
about this enemy. They described the Vichy pilots as prideful, yet chivalrous. For
example, two Wildcats ended up in the ocean because of their pilots’ misjudgment in
combat maneuvers and or high probability to commit friendly fire or mid air collision.
The loss of the two wing men allowed for a French Dewoitine 520 to shoot down
Lieutenant Wood. As the bullets ripped apart the oil cooler lines, his plane began to
descend towards the blue water. As Wood struggled with the dying plane, he looked to
his right and glimpsed what he perceived as a French pilot gloating over his victory. He
could see the Frenchman grinning wildly and waving as his plane tumbled towards the
sea. Wood’s plane hit the water hard. He squeezed out, inflating his “Mae West” flotation
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device. 280 Once pilots ditched in the water, the Navy attempted to recover them.
Destroyers, submarines, and other friendly vessels rescued a number of downed airmen.
Despite the setbacks and casualties suffered by the Wildcat units, American pilots
achieved some success. On November 8, the American Wildcat Unit VF-41 claimed
thirteen aerial kills, also one probable. In addition, they destroyed six enemy planes, and
damaged eight on the Cazes airfield. 281 Due to the inexperience of the American Navy
pilots, the cost was heavy, as seven Wildcats were shot down. Three additional planes
went missing under unknown circumstances.
Even though the Americans remained the designated force against the Vichy
French, some British units engaged the French defenders of their North African ports.
The RAF in TORCH performed much better than the Americans. Although they suffered
losses, they neutralized the Vichy airfields more efficiently. They did, however, make
mistakes since they had trained to fight specifically German aircraft and needed
experience to understand and overcome French planes and tactics. In one instance, pilots
of four Spitfires mistook French planes for Hurricanes at Tafaroui airfield. They wrongly
assumed that this airfield was under British control. As the Spitfires prepared to land,
they encountered four Dewoitines. These French planes attacked and brought down one
of the Spitfires, killing its pilot. The other Spitfires reacted by shooting down the three
remaining Dewoitines. 282 The group of Spitfires easily destroyed a column of French
Foreign Legion light tanks with their 20mm cannon, obliterating these targets. 283 The
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British pilots utilized their knowledge of air and ground battle tactics to quickly
neutralize the airfield, while suffering only the one loss.
Although the Twelfth Air Force played a minimal role in the assault phase of
Operation TORCH, it introduced American pilots to combat. On November 11, the
carrier operations ended with a ceasefire, as the local Vichy French command capitulated.
The difficulties that America’s naval fighter plane operation experienced paled in
comparison with the absolute failure the experimental air observation post program
endured. In a severe case of friendly fire, the American naval ships in the TORCH
invasion armada almost completely destroyed a group of American light reconnaissance
aircraft by “friendly fire.”
The Western Task Force, commanded by Major-General George S. Patton, Jr.,
covered the Moroccan coastal invasion. Patton assigned unarmed, forward observer L-4
planes to coordinate his artillery fire. Launched from the deck of the USS Ranger, these
planes attempted to provide guidance for direct fire support from the air for the ground
divisions moving into Casablanca. 284 The L-4’s wood construction rendered it highly
vulnerable. The slow, single engine L-4s had a similar construction to the civilian Piper
Cub model. 285 In preparation for the invasion, the American Navy packed these planes in
crates on board an aircraft carrier so quickly that the pilots and crews were unable to
examine them in training, let alone fly them. 286
The unusual appearance of these light aircraft confused the U.S. Navy. The L-4
planes did not appear in the Navy’s airplane identification recognition books, and naval
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gunners never viewed them prior to the TORCH landings. Consequently, many L-4s fell
victim to friendly fire during TORCH. On November 9, at 14:25, the light cruiser USS
Brooklyn failed to identify three L-4 observation planes and opened fire on them. 287 Soon
the entire fleet in the area opened fire, with its 20mm antiaircraft gun. One airplane took a
direct hit, and the round pierced its pilot’s leg. It spun out of control and crashed on the
coast, bursting into flames after the pilot made a successful escape by bailing out and
parachuting into the ocean. 288 The two other planes were damaged and crash landed
behind enemy lines. The Vichy French captured the downed pilots. Unaware of their
existence and silhouette, the naval gunners had assumed the L-4s were hostile.
American carrier-borne aircraft from the Santee attacked an airfield at
Casablanca. Before Operation TORCH, these American carrier pilots failed to log the
minimum requirement of two hundred hours of training in the F4F Wildcat. Even worse,
some had conducted only twenty-five carrier landings far short from the usual fifty. 289
Others in the group had accomplished only eighteen carrier landings on the carrier
Santee. At sea, they spent the last two weeks before the battle not flying. 290 Despite their
pilots’ insufficient flight training, the Wildcats successfully assisted the ground forces in
capturing the airfield by clearing the air threats strafing ground defenses and parked
aircraft. As a whole, the flight of Wildcats managed to destroy eight of ten French aircraft
on the ground, in addition to setting fire to the surrounding hangers. They, however,
failed to conserve fuel. Although their commanders instructed them to return to the
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carrier once their fuel dropped below the minimum level, the airmen ran their fuel tanks
so low that they had no choice but to land on the airbase they had just attacked.
The Army Air Corps fared no better, as it suffered great losses due to mishaps.
According to the American after action reports of the 33rd Fighter Group, accidents
occurred frequently during the operations on November 8th and 9th. These documents
reveal that the 58th, 59th, and 60th groups lost a total of twenty-seven aircraft during the
initial stage of the operation. 291 Pilot error was attributed to eight of these recorded
losses. In specific individual report accounts, the pilots blamed the loss of their aircraft to
unsatisfactory runway conditions. In contrast, five Navy Wildcats piloted by more
experienced aviators touched down safely on the same airfield. 292 The pilots taxied their
planes over to the enemy’s fuel depot to gas up. During takeoff, however, three of the
five planes crashed. 293 Carrier pilots normally took off assisted by a head wind, with their
ship turned into the wind before launch, negating the need for a cross wind takeoff. This
was another example of rushed and incomplete training taking its toll. Non-combat
casualties far exceeded those caused in combat by the enemy. Operational losses
accounted for twenty-three Wildcats on the first day of TORCH, with more losses
following during the operation. 294
Many Americans were so eager to fight and proud that they flew sorties in
formations consisting entirely of inexperienced pilots. By late November, only half of the
American planes in North Africa were air worthy; nearly half of the Allied planes lost in
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North Africa were due to crashes and accidents caused by pilot error. 295 According to an
article in Yank, the Army Weekly, American aviation training accidents often occurred. It
revealed that General Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air
Force, admitted this. Due to the need for secrecy, he had not revealed the full extent of
these mishaps. Instead, he conveyed to the press a mythical figure that claimed a
decreased training accident rate: ninety-five out of one hundred pilots, he asserted,
completed their twelve months of aerial training unharmed. 296 In Army at Dawn, Rick
Atkinson described the Allied Air command as “disorganized, poorly coordinated, and
split by rivalry and national chauvinism.” 297
Elsewhere, the RAF tried to ease the American pilots into combat by inserting a
few of them into unit flights of British aircraft. The British felt that the American Air
Forces diluted the strength of their battle-tested and effective Desert Air Force air arm as
the two forces integrated. The common British perception of their American counterparts
included such adjectives as “inexperienced,” “overconfident,” and “stubborn.”
American pilots did not share the level of exposure of RAF aviators. The British
had endured and survived years of war while America remained neutral. The Americans
did not replicate the same level of proficiency and familiarity of the battle-tested British
aviators. To the fresh American pilots, war was an unknown, often either frightening or
romanticized. Since they had yet to experience combat, no coping mechanisms were in
place to deal with the emotional trauma of warfare. A few of the new Wildcat pilots
appeared fearful when entering combat against the Vichy French. One of these,
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Lieutenant (J.G.) Charles Shields, confessed to the other pilots in his flight, “Gosh, I’ll
never forget the fright I had when those Vichy boys were peppering me, and I could hear
the bullets smacking against the armor plate, a decidedly insalubrious experience.” 298
Insufficient training left American pilots mentally unprepared for combat.
Pilot mistakes continued to plague the American air arm. The Twelfth Air Force
suffered many wrecks due to pilot error during Operation TORCH. On November 10,
1942, the US Naval escort carrier the Chenango launched 78 AAF P-40s to commence
air operations from the newly acquired air field at Port Lyautey, Morocco. 299 Seventeen
American P-40s out of a group of fifty-eight crashed while attempting to land on their
airfield, located near Casablanca, on November 10, 1942. 300 This group lost another
plane the next day, also from a failed landing. These mishaps were attributed to pilot
inexperience. 301 On the same day the Army Air Corps attempted to launch P-40s from an
American carrier with disastrous results. 302 Out of the seventy-seven planes of the 59th
Squadron ordered to fly to Port Lyautey, two crashed on take-off and one simply
vanished. 303 The British regarded many of the American P-40 pilots as too green for
dogfights; instead these pilots received simpler assignments, such as strafing runs. These
missions called for attacks on enemy trucks, roads, bridges, railroads, supply dumps, and
gun emplacements. While these tasks presented less risk than engaging enemy fighters,
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they too generated casualties. Colonel Peter McGoldrick died during one of these lower
risk assignments. 304
Although under-training contributed greatly to American air arm casualties,
equipment was also to blame. The aircraft in America’s arsenal in late 1942 were
unsuited for combat against the Luftwaffe. The underpowered P-40 and the untested P-38
Lightning were the signature aircraft flown in late 1942 by the American Twelfth and
Fifteenth Air Forces. The P-40 Warhawk could not compete with the latest version of the
Messerschmitt BF-109. P-40 pilot Colonel Baseler commented: “A P-40 couldn’t outrun
a Messerschmitt, couldn’t out-climb one, so you got bloody old having to wait for the
other guy to get tired before you could go home.” 305 These shortcomings presented
American pilots with a challenging learning curve before new and better performing
aircraft came into service.
After ground troops captured enemy airfields under the cover of naval fighter
aircraft, the Army Air Corps moved in. The achievements and performance of the
American Twelfth Air Force in the official AAF Guide are highly inflated and
misleading. This primary source exaggerates the effectiveness of the Twelfth Air Force.
It claims that the Twelfth Air Force played a decisive role in relieving the dangerous
situation at Kasserine Pass. In fact, while Rommel’s veterans slaughtered American
forces in the February 1943 Battle of Kasserine Pass, the Air Force played no useful
role. 306 The official AAF guide indicates that there was an inherently biased view to
portray the American air units in a positive light. The document further claims that, in a
three month period starting in November of 1942, the Twelfth Air Force destroyed more
304

Ernest R. McDowell. The P-40 Kittyhawk (New York: Arco Publishing, 1968), 18.
McDowell, 20.
306
Official AAF Guide, 287.
305

121
than four hundred enemy planes. 307 Their total operations, in combination with the
Fifteenth Air Force, ranging from November 1942 to March 1, 1944, included 199,179
total sorties flown. On these missions, Allied planes dropped 106,567 tons of bombs. The
two air forces lost 1,473 planes in aerial combat while allegedly shooting down 2,959
enemy planes. 308 The government manipulated and inflated these numbers by including
probable and suspected kills in the totals. It also omitted the cases of airplane losses
attributed to mishaps and accidents, which distorted their statistics. The accounts of
losses from primary journals reveal the number of casualties were far greater than
portrayed in the official records.
Contemporary records purposefully manipulated numbers to record a ratio of
more enemy planes destroyed than American losses. When this evidence is contrasted
with primary documents, we see a much different picture. The pilots over-inflated
numbers by including claims of probable kills and exaggerations. The list of planes lost
does not entirely explain the cause of these casualties. As revealed in the diaries of both
American naval and air corps pilots, inexperience or mechanical failure directly
contributed to the loss of many American planes. 309 Many pilots, unable to find their
carriers, ran out of fuel and ditched their planes in the ocean. The escort carrier Santee
alone lost six aircraft due to mishaps and more to others reducing its fighter force to nine
operational aircraft. 310 Other pilots crashed into carrier decks, damaging or destroying
their aircraft. These losses contributed to American setbacks. Accidents related to
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inadequate training and pilot error continued to plague American pilots of the Army Air
Corps and the Navy after the North Africa invasion.
On November 14, 1942, headquarters tasked a squadron made up of twelve
American P-40Fs to assist a ground attack on Rabat. The squadron consisted of J
Squadron replacements that lacked any combat experience. Second Lieutenant Marvin
Carpenter, one of the P-40 pilots, got separated from his squadron and, due probably to
his insufficient navigational training, never returned to base. 311 On November 19, eleven
days after the initial invasion, Second Lt. Kenneth R. Smith died when he crashed his
damaged P-40 Wildcat after colliding in the air with a fellow countryman, whose pilot’s
plane luckily survived. 312 The American Air Forces did not immediately record these
numbers because losses that resulted from accidents reflected negatively on the naval air
arm’s reputation, and they deemed such losses unrelated to combat. This information
further the illustrates American air units’ unpreparedness for combat and its excessive
numbers of accidents and losses.
Beyond America’s unpreparedness in flight training, air tactical doctrine was so
seriously flawed that American fighter planes provided little support to ground units.
However, the mere sight of airplanes over the battlefield increased morale among ground
units. As long as the troops recognized planes bearing their country’s markings flying
overhead, they drew comfort. Often, however, these planes were on reconnaissance
missions.313 The RAF conducted an offensive air campaign over Libya in late 1942 that
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crippled Axis forward ground positions. This cleared the way for the British 8th Army. 314
In contrast, American air support for the ground units often failed to materialize. On the
rare occasions when planes did support ground troops, they sometimes mistook friendly
troops for the enemy.
Air coverage almost remained non-existent for the American ground troops in the
desert. United States air units often failed to coordinate with ground units. American
troops landing on the eastern beaches of French Algeria in Operation TORCH dealt with
German aircraft after they moved toward Tunisia. German dive bombers constantly
tormented American ground troops. When friendly aircraft appeared over American
troops at Medjez-el-Bab, a major instance of “friendly fire” occurred. The battered
company of American tank destroyers at first welcomed the sight of eleven twin-boomed
P-38 Lightnings at first, until their pilots swooped down and executed five strafing runs,
almost completely destroying the unit. The strike killed five solders and wounded sixteen.
It obliterated most of the company’s vehicles and antitank weapons. 315 The pilots flying
the Lightnings failed to recognize their own troops, even though the soldiers gleefully
waved and cheered from the ground. A properly trained and experienced pilot could
identify the silhouettes of his own nation’s tanks and equipments. Again, American pilots
lacked this knowledge. As the ground units advanced against the enemy, they expected
support from coordinated allied air cover. Tragically, American pilots failed to coordinate
with these ground forces. The Stuka, an aircraft highly vulnerable to enemy fighters
attacked Allied ground units unopposed.
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The number of American accidents and cases of friendly fire continued to
increase during the North African campaign. On February 3, 1943, American planes
bombed the United States’ supply train at Sened Station in Tunisia. Based on this
incident, British Air commanders commented in disgust that American pilots proved to
be both poor map readers and ineffective bombers. Not only did the American pilots
mistakenly strike their friendly target, their aim was so inaccurate that they missed by
five hundred yards. 316 These continuing incidents underscored the United States Army
Air Force’s poor state of preparedness for the campaign. Mistakes resulting so frequently
from inadequate training and other factors cost American lives and hampered Allied
efforts.
American air units made many mistakes during Operation TORCH. They failed to
coordinate their efforts with those of the land forces. In contrast, the British understood
the importance of communication and cooperation between army and air units. British
Army generals visited RAF bases to ensure that base commanders were effectively
providing cover for ground troops. The army required the RAF to perform
reconnaissance missions over forward enemy positions, provide tactical air support, and
attack enemy supply lines. The commander of the British Eighth Army possessed the
authority to command air missions. On November 26, 1941, the Eighth Army’s
commanding general, General Cunningham, tasked RAF’s No. 451 Squadron to strike
targets. 317 RAF commanders, in conjunction with the Army generals, designed sorties in
North Africa to help the army. As experts analyzed photographs of the target areas of
interest, they provided feedback to the RAF. This method proved effective in the desert.
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The dangers and suffering associated with war shocked many ill-equipped, green
American pilots. Fates of downed pilots included burning to death, stranding in the
desert, or drowning in the Mediterranean. Atkinson recognized that the poor
performance of American servicemen in Operation TORCH called for a response by
Allied leaders. Eisenhower acknowledged this situation and unified his administration
towards a common goal: compensating for casualties and clearly executing the agreed
directive. 318 Operation TORCH and the subsequent fight in eastern Algeria and Tunisia
gave American pilots the opportunity to learn from their mistakes and adapt new
techniques and skills. The performance of the American air forces parallels Rick
Atkinson’s negative assessment of the ground units’ shortcomings in Operation TORCH.
Poor training and inexperience led American air and ground units to perform poorly in
Operation TORCH. Inadequate equipment contributed to this. The American army
outfitted units with lightly armored outdated tanks, and the Air Corps flew underpowered
aircraft. American tanks and anti-tank guns could not easily penetrate enemy armor with
their shells, and most American aircraft could be easily outmaneuvered and overtaken by
enemy fighters. In addition to insufficient equipment, troops and pilots suffered from
inadequate training.
According to Eisenhower, TORCH provided a learning experience as well as a
baptism by fire for American airmen. Eisenhower reflected on this when he wrote:
“TORCH revealed profound shortcomings in leadership, tactics, equipment, martial élan,
and common sense.” 319 His words revealed the truth of the situation. The American
military entered TORCH severely unprepared and poorly organized. American
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coordination and use of air power did not the meet expectations of the Allied Command.
The American generals radically overhauled their tactics and relations between air and
ground forces based on lessons they learned from TORCH. General Hap Arnold
established a new air doctrine of tactics derived from the mistakes and lessons of
TORCH. In his Field Manual 100-20, published on July 21, 1943, he stated the basic
principle that land and air power existed as co-equal independent forces. He stressed the
importance of achieving air superiority, as it played an important role in protecting
ground forces. 320
Britain and America recognized the importance of Allied cooperation and their
leaders discussed methods for future improvement. During Operation TORCH, the
British and American air units and commands failed to work together. America’s
attempts at aerial reconnaissance and air artillery observation largely failed.
Communication during TORCH was erratic and slow. To remedy this problem, the
Americans applied the wireless telegraph to the battlefield. 321
Due to their usefulness in the desert, the fighter bombers played a key role. The
planes had the capability of attacking enemy airfields as well as enemy fighters. In order
to achieve effective use of its fighter bombers, command needed to employ battle trained
pilots. The Allies found strafing attacks to be costly due to exposure to ground fire, as
well as the higher a probability of collision at such low altitudes. After their initial
landings in Northwest Africa, the Allies depended on their air power to push into Tunisia.
The Twelfth Air Force suffered 2,000 aircrew casualties in the Tunisian campaign, which
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began on November 12, 1942, and ended on May 13, 1943. 322 These numbers included
404 pilots killed, 423 wounded, and 1,173 captured or missing throughout the campaign.
American land forces suffered 11,984 casualties, with 1,986 soldiers killed. 323
Combat usually developed survival instincts and tactics in the pilots, traits
unobtainable any other way. After Operation TORCH, air operations continued in the
desert, and American pilots gained experience. Even so, they still required British
assistance. In Cairo, on June 11, 1943, Air Chief Marshal Tedder ordered three more
American air groups to join the Ninth Air Force. The RAF deployed six additional flights
to patrol the area to add security for the American 9th Air Force. 324 The British strongly
believed that the Americans needed extra support, as evidenced by their poor
performance in Operation TORCH. General Dwight D. Eisenhower hoped exposure to
combat would develop the fighting spirit of American ground troops and pilots. 325 In
reality, American air units continued to suffer from numerous accidents.
These setbacks contributed to the low expectations shared among the leaders of
the American air forces. General Doolittle viewed the appalling losses suffered by the
American Twelfth Air Force his an after action report on November 30 with
disappointment but not surprise. It reported eight planes shot down by enemy aircraft,
twelve destroyed by friendly and enemy ground fire, and an unprecedented forty-nine
planes lost to accidents and unknown causes. 326 Doolittle admitted that he expected that
“wastage from crashes, disappearances, and internments would be high in TORCH.” 327
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Knowing the consequences of sending an inexperienced air force into battle, Doolittle
understood that it was the only available option.
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Conclusion: Lessons Learned

In contrast to the highly trained and experienced RAF pilots, American airmen,
especially those who flew fighter aircraft during Operation TORCH, were inexperienced
and unprepared to such an extent that accidents and mishaps occurred. My research
augments Rick Atkinson’s work, An Army at Dawn, the first part of his Liberation
Trilogy. In many ways these two arguments parallel each other. While my discussion is
centered on aircraft, Atkinson’s work discussed ground forces. Much in the same way as
American airmen, Atkinson concluded that the American ground forces’ unpreparedness
and insufficient training caused poor performance and unnecessary casualties during the
opening day of Operation TORCH, starting with the initial invasion on November 8,
1942. Atkinson laid particular emphasis upon the frequent American calamites that
occurred throughout the operation. He concluded that these incidents influenced a
rethinking of American strategy and its implementation in modern warfare. I have taken
his premise and applied it to the American air units involved in the opening days of
TORCH and their performance. Most specifically, the U.S. Navy’s carrier launched F4F
Wildcats, P-40s, and the few P-38 Lightnings flying for the United States Army Air
Corps. I also include in my analysis the performance of ill-fated L-4 observation planes,
which could not fully fulfill complete their mission, are also included in my analysis.
My conclusion also parallels that of Atkinson, in explaining why the Army Air
Corps and the United States Naval aviators, who experienced so many losses attributed to
pilot error, inexperience, and faulty training. Samuel Elliot Morrison’s meticulously
detailed work on the actions of the Navy provided a solid resource for the full
understanding of the aircraft carriers’ role in the operation which launched the Wildcats.

130
Morrison provided empirical evidence that allowed me to arrive at my conclusions. This
work also served as a reference for locating the specific squadron numbers which led me
to the archival records. These records contained after action reports, which documented
the overwhelming number of accidents involving the aircraft based on the carriers.
Norman Gelb’s findings highlighted the half trained and deficiently equipped quality of
American Forces going into Operation TORCH. Information taken from after action
reports further solidified my hypothesis.

Based upon a wide variety of primary sources, including the original after action
reports, accounts from the VF-41, VF-9, VF-26, VF-28 Squadrons of F4F Wildcats, and
diaries of Wildcat pilots flying combat sorties, I conclude that American pilots were not
ready for combat on November 8, 1942. In order to place into context the American
pilots’ unpreparedness, I turned to British pilots’ experience and training to offer a
contrast. I examined the casual factors behind the pilots’ deficient performance by
comparing the fighter pilot curriculum materials and pilot training textbooks of the
American air forces to their British RAF counterparts’ more refined and detailed training
texts and training materials. I drew upon a wide array of secondary, primary,
photographic, and oral sources. These primary materials, key secondary sources, records
of the training facilities, and pilot and cadet safety magazines uncovered the severity of
training mishaps, as well as the substandard level of American pilot training when
compared the RAF’s battle tested methods.

My research and thesis fits into the scholarship on Operation TORCH and the war
in the Mediterranean. They provide a fresh look at the Air Forces involved and the ill-
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trained state of the American pilots. My thesis falls into a consensus with other works on
the subject, especially Atkinson’s, which agree that the American Military endured
mistakes because of their unpreparedness. American aviation during Operation TORCH
suffered from rushed and inadequate training, parallel to the shortcomings of ground and
naval forces, as described by secondary sources. Just as Atkinson demonstrated that
America’s ground troops were tested prematurely, during TORCH and the subsequent
North African campaign, aviation at sunrise fared no better.
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U.S. Navy Air Combat Casualties Operation TORCH

Name/Rank
Lt. (j.g.) S.M.
Amesbury
Lt. (j.g) Charles V.
August
ARM Geo. Biggs
Lt Cdr. John T.
Blacknburn
ARM Durward
Balkley
Lt. (j.g) G.M. Braun

Air Unit
VF-9

Date
11/9

Remarks
KIA

VF-41

11/8

Parachuted, POW

VS-41
VGF-29

11/8
11/8

KIA
Ditched, rescued

VGS-29

11/8

Wounded

VF-9

11/8

Lt. G.H. Carter

VF-41

11/8

AOM Jack Carter
Ens. A.B. Conner
Ens. Charles
Dougherty
Ens. Charles Duffy
ARM Robt. C.
Ethridge
Ens. Alfred Fecke

VGS-27
VF-41
BB. Mass

11/10
11/8
11/8

Ditched, wounded,
rescued
Ditched, wounded,
rescued
KIA
Ditched, rescued
Shot down, POW

VS-41
BB Mass

11/8
11/8

VGF-29

11/10

Ens. Uncas Fretwell

VGF-29

11/8

Lt. T.A. Grell
AOM Walter Gorka
Lt. (j.g.) Mayo
Hadden
ARM Alfred Hann

VF-41
VGS-27
VF-9

11/8
11/10
11/9

VGS-29

11/8

AOM Geo.
Hinckley
S. Harry P. Kimball

VGS-29

11/10

VGS-29

11/8

ARM Herman
Ludwig
ARM Robert K.
McConnell
Ens. A.L Menard

VGS-29

11/8

VGS-29

11/9

Crashed takeoff
Santee, rescued
Crashed takeoff
Santee, rescued
Wounded

VF-9

11/9

Crashed on Ranger

KIA
Shot down,
wounded, POW
Force landing Safi,
nosed over damaged
plane on landing
Force landing Safi,
nosed over
Ditched rescued
KIA
Wounded
Crashed takeoff
Santee, rescued
Wounded
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Ens. C.E. Mikronis

VF-41

11/8

Ens. William P.
Naylor
Ens. Robt. O’Neil
ARM Aubra
Patterson
Ens. Robt. Paterson

VGF-29

11/8

VGS-27
VS-41

11/10
11/8

VGF-29

11/8

Lt. (j.g.) Donald C.
Rodeen
Lt. William Staggs
AMM Enoch
Tarsilla
Lt. (j.g.) Chas. A
Sheilds
Ens. John
Thompson
Lt (j.g.) Geo.
Trumpter
Ens. Edward
VanVranken
Ens. Chas.
Warnstaff
Ens. T.M. Wihoite
Lt T.H. Winters Jr.
Lt. M.T. Wordell

VGS-29

11/9

VGS-29
VGS-29

11/9
11/9

VF-41

11/8

Force Landing
Mazagan, POW
AA, crash landing,
wounded, POW
Wounded
AA, crash landing,
POW
Parachuted, POW

VGS-29

11/10

Forced landing Safi

VGF-29

11/10

KIA

VGF-29

11/8

VGS-29

11/8

VF-9
VF-9
VF-41

11/8
11/8
11/8

Force landing
Mazagan, POW
Crashed takeoff
Santee, rescued
KIA
Wounded
Crash landed,
wounded, POW

332

332

NARA Naval Records

Parachuted,
wounded, POW
Force landing
Mazagan, POW
KIA
KIA
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U.S. Navy Aircraft Losses All Causes Operation TORCH
Carrier Air Group
Aircraft Type
Ranger
F4F-4
SBD-3
Total
Suwannee
F4F-4
TBF-1
Total
Sangamon
SBD-3
TBF-1
Total
Santee
F4F-4
SBD-3
TBF-1
Total
All Carrier Groups
Total
333

333

NARA Naval Records

Number Lost
12
3
15
3
2
5
2
1
3
10
4
7
21
44

